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ABSTRACT 
ANALYZING TURKEY'S INTERACTIONS WITH 
GREECE AND SYRIA IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 
Bayer, Re~t 
M.S., Department oflntemational Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Serdar Giiner 
July 1999 
The aim of this study is to analyze foreign policy patterns of Turkey within 
the context of Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Syrian relations. The interactions between 
Turkey and its neighbors are analyzed for the period between 1990 and 1998 on a 
scale ranging from cooperation to hostility. Content analysis and, more particularly, 
events data are applied. The issues analyzed are those pertaining to the Aegean Sea, 
Cyprus, security and water. The premise, which argues that Turkey has adopted a 
dynamic foreign policy in the 1990s, was investigated and the results generally 
support it. Turkey is found to be the most active country in the study whose average 
behavior was usually more assertive than the rest. The use of content analysis 
enabled the systematic study of Turkish foreign policy. The theoretical, 
methodological and practical implications are further discussed in this study. 
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OZET 
TDRKiYE'NiNSOGUKSAVA~SONRASIDONEMDE 
YUNANiST AN VE SURiYE iLE ETKiLE~iMiNiN ANALizi 
Bayer, Re~at 
Yuksek Lisans, Uluslararas1 ili~kiler Bolumu 
Tez Yoneticisi: Yrd. Do9. Dr. Serdar Guner 
Temmuz 1999 
Bu 9ah~mamn amac1 Turk d1~ politikasmm egilimlerini Turk-Yunan ve Turk-
Suriye ili~kileri 9er9evesinde incelemektir. Turkiye ile kom~ulan arasmdaki 
etkile~im 1990 ila 1998 donemini kapsayacak ~ekilde i~birliginden husumete kadar 
yayllan bir yelpaze iyinde analiz edilmi~tir. i9erik 9ozumlemesi ve daha ozlu olarak, 
olay verileri kullamlm1~tir. Ege, Kibns, giivenlik ve suya ili~kin konular 
incelenmi~tir. l 990'h y1llarda Tiirkiye'nin daha dinamik bir d1~ politika benimsedigi 
tezi ara~tmlm1~ ve vanlan sonu9lar genelde bu tezi desteklemi~tir. Bu 9ah~mada ele 
alman iilkeler arasmda Tiirkiye, en aktif ve digerlerinden daha belirleyici bir 
davram~a sahip ulke olarak saptanm1~tlr. i9erik 9oziimlemesinin kullamlmas1, Turk 
d1:;; politikasmm sistematik tarzda belirlenmi:;; goriiniimunii 91kartmaya yard1mc1 
olmu~tur. Teorik, metodolojik ve pratik yans1malar 9ah~mada daha aynntth ~ekilde 
tart1~1lmaktadir. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
An era of uncertainty has clouded the international arena following the 
alteration of the international environment as a result of post-1989 events. The 
breaking up of the Soviet Union and the diminishing of Russian power signaled the 
end of the Cold War. Just like many other actors, Turkey experienced an element of 
change in its international environment. This situation was, however, not unique to 
Turkey. Countries throughout the world were experiencing the same situation. 
However, whereas many members of the US-led alliance against the USSR 
felt more secure with the end of the Cold War, Turkey did not (Mtiftti, 1998: 33 ). 
Within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA TO), Turkey is one of the two 
countries that did not experience peace dividends. 1 Former Undersecretary of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs ~tikrti Elekdag's article, "2 Y2 War Strategy" ( 1996) 
clearly shows that Turkey was still expecting aggression: Fighting on two fronts 
consecutively and matching an internal enemy had to be anticipated. The threat 
from the north no longer existed (for the time being) but Turkey was fearing for the 
worst from others. The two explicitly mentioned countries are Greece and Syria. 
Turkey's interactions with Greece and Syria constitute an interesting subject-
matter. Amongst Turkey's neighbors, these countries are arguably the two that 
Turkey has the most strained relations with. In fact, it is known that Turkish strategy 
1 The other country being Greece. 
makers believe that these two countries are deeply hostile as seen in Elekdag's article 
(see also Mtiftti, 1998: 34-36). The "Sevres syndrome" (a belief that the world is 
trying to break up Turkey) lies at the foundation of this perception (Kinzer, l 998b: 
6). 
In this study, Turkey's interactions with Greece and Syria in the post-Cold 
War era will be analyzed through the use of content analysis in order to grasp 
Turkey's foreign policy patterns on a number of issues of importance for Turkey. 
These issues are the Aegean Sea and Cyprus with Greece and security and water with 
Syria. This study measures cooperation and conflict in bilateral relations between 
Turkey and Syria and Turkey and Greece. The cooperativeness and hostility of the 
actors, and, particularly, Turkey will be one of the focal points of attention. The 
impact of external events on foreign policy patterns undergo scrutiny. It will be 
maintained that one external event had little effect (Richard Holbrooke's mediation) 
while another external event had an effect (Turkish-Israeli rapprochement). Turkish 
foreign policy will be examined primarily for the activism in its external relations 
during the 1990s, it has demonstrated in the issue as well as for its general approach 
to the issue (i.e., one espousing cooperation or hostility). 
The use of content analysis, and events data m particular, enables a 
systematic approach to foreign policy. It is imperative that formal approaches be 
conducted so as to arrive at a fuller understanding of Turkey's external relations. 
During this process, the issues also experience the same methodical application. A 
coding process encompassing cooperative and hostile actions was used on Reuters 
news wires dispatched between January 1990 and December 1998. Events were 
coded on a scale ranging from significant peaceful moves ( + 3) to overt hostile moves 
(-3). 
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A. Foreign Policy Patterns 
Studies on Turkish foreign policy have usually underlined similar factors: 
caution and support for international order and peace. The Turkish Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs says that Turkey's foreign policy is based on Mustafa Kemal 
Atattirk's principle of 'Peace at Home and Peace in the World' (l 998a: 3 ). According 
to Oral Sander, Turkish foreign policy has been influenced by Atattirk's goals of 
creation of a nation-state based on a nineteenth-century European model, Turkey's 
occupation of a commendable position in the international arena while practicing the 
principle of 'Peace at Home and Peace in the World', and promotion of Turks to the 
level of 'contemporary civilization' (1993: 34). Sharing a border with the former 
Soviet Union and the volatile nature of the Middle East impelling Turkey to look 
towards the West are suggested as some of the factors that shaped Turkish foreign 
policy (Sander, 1993 ). However, Turkey started to become more self reliant during 
the 1980s as a result of differences of opinion with the West and improvement of its 
own capabilities (Sander, 1993: 43). In a study from the turn of the decade, Philip 
Robins says that Turkey's policy towards the Middle East is largely based on non-
interference (1991: 65-67). The fundamental problem with the creation of 
Republican Turkish foreign policy, according to Selim Deringil, was "readjustment 
to secondary power status from an Imperial past" (1992: 1 ). This factor coupled 
with the Turkish identity crisis has made it virtually impossible for the establishment 
of a Turkish foreign policy. This situation propelled Turkey to support the status 
quo ante as well being anti-revisionist. 
In a detailed study, Malik Mtiftti (1998) assesses the current security 
environment and the various factors which have shaped Turkish policy orientation. 
He maintains that while Greeks and Syrians are 'enemies,' ('natural allies' against 
Turkey according to Elekdag, 1996) Russians and Iranians are 'rivals.' He points out 
3 
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that Turkish foreign policy is witnessing a debate between those supporting caution 
and those advocating boldness (or 'daring') with the civilian and military 
bureaucracies falling behind the first category (Milfti.i, 1998: 48 ). 
Many works maintain that Turkey is becoming increasingly active m its 
foreign policy in the 1990s. Stephen Kinzer writes, "But despite ... domestic 
uncertainty [lack of a stable government since the 1995 elections], Turkish foreign 
policy has become tougher and more forceful than ever" (l 999a: 5). According to 
Kemal Kiri~i, Turkey met the challenge of the post-Cold War by becoming more 
active and assertive (1994: 407). Former French Ambassador to Turkey, Eric 
Rouleau uses the qualification "remarkable dynamism" to describe Turkish 
diplomacy in the post-Cold War era (1993: 113). Morton I. Abramowitz, a former 
US ambassador to Turkey, wrote that President Turgut Ozal's death (on April 17, 
1993) would alter Turkey's political process and that Turkish citizens realize that a 
certain amount of international clout surrounds them (1993: 164). Yet, there have 
been voices which have been against Turkey taking a more active role in its region. 
For example, Ersin Kalayc10glu believes that the citizens of Turkey have nothing to 
gain at the moment from Turkish involvement in regional affairs (1994: 414). ~ule 
Kut says that Turkey has become much more active in the international arena 
(including interventionist, multidirectional) but is still cautious and following a 
realist policy (1998: 58). ~adi Ergilven9 indicates that Turks realized that 'Turkey 
looked bigger from outside than it did to them from inside. Freed from the 
constraints of the Cold War era, Turkey seemed to have a better chance of playing 
bigger and different roles" (1998: 38). Alan Makovsky, in an article entitled, "The 
New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy," points towards the post-Gulf War era 
during which Turkey broke from its shell and became more dynamic ( 1999: 92-113 ). 
Ziya Oni~ maintains that Turkey is moving from "passive neutrality" to becoming an 
4 
important regional actor (1995: 50). Taking such declarations into account, we find 
it instructive to pose the following questions: Is this really the case? Is it possible to 
say that Turkey has become more active and assertive since the beginning of this 
decade? 
The end of the Cold War is by and large taken as a turning point m 
international affairs as many have noted (Fukuyama, 1989; Mearsheimer, 1990; and 
Huntington, 1993 ). This manner of thinking is also in line with the notion that 
middle-range powers and regional great powers will find themselves as being more 
influential in the post-Cold War era (as opposed to the previous era during which 
their roles were relatively constrained and subordinate).2 Research on middle powers 
indicate that they will find it easier to maneuver in a time of uncertainty and when 
the relations between middle and great powers are not intense (Mtiftiiler and Yliksel, 
1997: 184-196).3 It is maintained in this research that Turkey became increasingly 
more active and assertive in the era of uncertainty marking the international arena 
since the end of the Cold War. Activity in foreign policy is evaluated in this study 
through the number of initiations and actions taken on an issue by an actor. 
It is tentatively proposed that Turkey has become increasingly more active 
throughout the 1990s. Based on this assumption, Turkey should have undertaken 
more actions in the late 1990s, e.g., 1998, than in the early 1990s, e.g., 1990. 
Although this research could have been conducted by reviewing the number of new 
international organizations that Turkey has spearheaded in the 1990s such as the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation and the Developing Eight, the viability (let alone 
Middle-range powers are countries committed to the maintenance of international order and 
security. Regional great powers must. at least, be part of a region and a key player in regional 
affairs. 
For more on middle powers and regional powers. see Cooper. 1997: Neumann. 1992: Lake and 
Morgan. 1998: and Ayoob. 1989-1990. 
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utility) of these formations is still suspect and relevant data for a systematic approach 
is limited. 
On the issues studied, the overall pattern of interactions for the 1990s will be 
determined. This will be done so as to understand Turkey's general approach to the 
issues and to obtain a picture of its negotiation style. It will also be possible to 
understand how Turkey's actions differ with those of the other sides. The questions 
that will be answered here are, "what has Turkey's approach been in the 1990s and 
how does it compare with those of the other actors (primarily Greece and Syria) as 
well as the other issues studied?" The positions of the actors will be approached 
from the point of how much cooperation and hostility they demonstrated. 4 
There have also been external inputs into these interactions. Certain external 
events could have influenced the happenings and changed the course of events. One 
interesting type of external intervention is mediation. There have been numerous 
mediation efforts on Turkish-Greek relations, especially over the Cyprus issue. The 
United Nations (UN) has been conducting them for decades. However, as this 
research is on Turkey in the 1990s, it was more appropriate to examine a newer, 
purely 1990s mediation effort. This and other reasons led to the selection of US 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke's mission. This mission is a 
confirmation of the important place this topic occupies for the United States as 
indicated by researchers (Mirbagheri, 1998). Secondly, Holbrooke said at the outset 
of his mission to Cyprus in March 1995 that he was aspiring for a repeat of the 
"historic breakthrough that (French) General (Charles) de Gaulle and (German 
Chancellor) Konrad Adenauer effected between France and Germany in the late 50s 
• Following Robert Keohane, international cooperation is defined as occmTing "when actors adjust 
their behavior to the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy 
coordination" ( 1984: 51) while hostility is taken as implying "goal-seeking behavior that strives to 
reduce the gains available to others or to impede their want-satisfaction" (Milner, 1992: 468). 
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and early 60s ... an historic change in the map of Europe" and Washington was 
hopeful that the "big push" towards peace on the island would occur (Giacomo, 
1995). An attempt will be made here to see whether he achieved this goal. It is 
believed that Holbrooke's ongoing missions have had little positive impact. Bearing 
in mind that he "declared 1996 as being 'the year of Cyprus"', this year is going to be 
investigated ("Cyprus," 1996). 
Bilateral relations are also affected by the relationships between one of the 
actors and a third actor. Syria maintains that their relations with Turkey have been 
negatively influenced by Israel's increasing amount of cooperation with Turkey. 
States in the region look upon this pact uneasily despite Turkish and Israeli official 
attempts to portray this pact as not being directed against others. The Syrian 
assertion, thus, merits attention. Although this relationship has been steadily 
building up throughout the 1990s, it has gained much momentum after the signing of 
a military accord between Turkey and Syria in 1996. The Syrians were especially 
rattled when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced the "main axis 
of a regional security arrangement" shortly before Turkish Prime Minister Mesut 
Y1lmaz's visit to Israel in 1997 (Hamza, 1998). Despite denials to the contrary, it is 
believed that the increasing ties with Israel altered Turkey's stance towards Syria. 
Thus, there should be a change in the Turkish position before 1996 and that after. 
These questions have not been significantly dealt with but are important as 
they will say much about Turkish foreign policy in general. However, it is evident 
that as there are few countries in this research, there will only be a partial 
understanding. Yet, the importance of these countries for Turkey should not be 
underestimated. The issues that are being examined are certainly significant for 
Turkey and in answering these questions it will be possible to see Turkish foreign 
policy patterns. 
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B. Issues of Aegean Sea, Cyprus, Security and Water 
There are a number of issues that separate these countries. In the Turkish-
Greek case, the Cyprus conflict and claims over the Aegean Sea are the two main 
issues. In the Turkish-Syrian case, the primary problems can be cited as being over 
security and water. The term 'security' covers terrorism, arms smuggling, and drug 
trafficking. Evidence of Syrian support rendered to the Kurdistan Workers Party 
(PKK) is directly covered under this term. As this paper is on Turkish foreign 
policy, Syrian security anxiety arising from Israel is not covered here. The water 
issue concerns the amount of water that Turkey and Syria are bargaining over. Iraq 
is also a partner to these negotiations as it also uses the Euphrates River but it was 
not included in this study. This is because the repercussions of the Gulf War 
following its operation in Kuwait have meant that it was quite muted about this 
topic. 
The Aegean Sea is taken from a holistic perspective m this research to 
include all sub-issues in the Aegean Sea between the two countries. While Greece 
believes that the only real problem between Turkey and Greece is the continental 
shelf and everything else is Turkish aggression, such an examination would have 
meant that there would be little to analyze.5 
In this study, the issue of Cyprus includes all relevant moves of the Cypriot 
governments, Greece, and Turkey. Most of the moves deal with security matters and 
the relationship between the communities. In the issues of Cyprus and Aegean Sea, 
matters concerning the European Union (EU) were only included if they were 
relevant to the issue. For example, Turkish North Cyprus's refusal to join the 
Greece says that the only issue is the continental shelf. Other Aegean disputes "consist 
exclusively of arbitrary claims against Greek sovereignty put forth by Turkey in defiance of 
international law and agreements" and "Turkey has 'discovered' problems" for the goal of 
continental shelf. Greece gives the continental shelf such a status because of the rulings of the 
International Court of Justice. See Hellenic Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998. 
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accession talks with the EU was included for the message that it sent the Greek side 
and not from a Turkish-EU perspective. 
At certain times, other issues have occupied the center stage, e.g., minority 
treatment in Greece and Greece's stance in the EU towards Turkey. Importantly, 
these countries also enjoy good understandings on certain issues, e.g., the Turkish-
Syrian stance on discussions over Iraqi dismemberment and the Turkish-Greek joint 
intervention to Albania in April 1997. 
Yet, these have been sporadic and not the key elements in determining the 
relations between the countries. The data available from Reuters confirms the 
importance of the chosen issues: A simple word count conducted for relations 
between Turkey and Greece from 1990 onwards shows that the word 'Cyprus' 
appeared more than 1,500 times and the word 'Aegean' appeared more than 750 
times. In the case of relations with Syria, while Syrian claims on the Turkish 
province of Hatay (Sandjak of Alexandretta) are important, it is hard to pinpoint 
direct examples of it whereas security and water matters are easier. 
Although this research investigates Turkey's relations with Syria and Greece, 
other actors also had to be included in the study of certain issues, such as the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots and Lebanon. Both Cypriot communities have many 
agreements (political, military, and economical) with the 'motherlands.' There is 
much synchronization between the sides, as seen in the military cooperation 
agreement signed between the Greek parties in 1993 and the Turkish security 
guarantee given to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1997. In the 
case of Lebanon, it should be remembered that the Bekaa Valley (which used to be a 
training ground for various terrorist groups) is officially part of Lebanon but Syria 
has much say in its administration (Harik, 1997). Although it is true that adding 
these actors does change somewhat the scope of the study, not including them would 
9 
have resulted in a partial understanding of the matter. This is because these issues 
could not have been studied without the inclusion of these actors. 
C. Findings 
The results indicate that Turkey was the more assertive and active country in 
the issues studied for the nine years under examination. Turkey was the relatively 
more cooperative actor only in the Aegean Sea issue. The premise of Turkey 
becoming more active over the 1990s is supported but with the qualification that it is 
not an ever-increasing (as attested through the fluctuations) or ubiquitous (as seen in 
the water issue) dynamism. A significant change in pattern is observed after 1995 
with Turkey becoming both more assertive and active in the period between 1995 
and 1998. The findings present Holbrooke's mediation in the Cyprus problem as 
ineffective but rather give support to the view that mediation efforts by themselves 
are not enough to alter the course of events. Also, the increasing Turkish-Israeli 
cooperation influenced Turkey's relations with Syria negatively. The use of content 
analysis (and events data) helped in obtaining an image of Turkish foreign policy 
that is systematically derived. 
D. Method: Content Analysis 
Content analysis is a scientific method for going beyond the data and arriving 
at the crux of the message. It has been described as a technique of measurement, 
description, and inference. Krippendorff describes it as a "research technique for 
making replicable and valid inferences from data to their context" (1980: 2 l ). 
Similarly, Holsti said that it is "any technique for making inferences by objectively 
and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages" (1968: 14). 
Shapiro and Markoff define it as "any methodical measurement applied to text (or 
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other symbolic material) for social science purpose" (1997: 14). "A research 
methodology that utilizes a set of procedures to make valid inferences from text" is 
Weber's definition (1985: 9). The text can be any medium of communication. After 
breaking the various definitions of content analysis into their components, Shapiro 
and Markoff come up with the following plausible definition for content analysis, 
"any systematic reduction of a flow of text (or other symbols) to a standard set of 
statistically manipulable symbols representing the presence, the intensity or the 
frequency of some characteristics relevant to social science" (1997: 14). 
In a nutshell, content analysis simplifies the process of collecting and 
analyzing the content of text (Neuman, 1997: 272): "A central idea in content 
analysis is that many words of the text are classified into much fewer content 
categories" (Weber, 1985: 12). Such a technique is obviously useful in international 
affairs where large volumes of data are created daily. In international affairs, 
content analysis is used in foreign policy analysis where it appears in the fonn of 
events data. 
Events data is a process of content analysis which involves three steps: 
identifying the news sources, developing a coding system or using an existing one, 
and training coders (Schrodt, 1995: 148-149). This process captures individual 
foreign policy behaviors of actors into categories through the examination of public 
documents and assigns codes to the reported interaction. They "are a formal method 
of measuring the phenomena that contribute to foreign policy perceptions" (Schrodt, 
1995: 146). The aim of events data is to see if a pattern emerges and one subject that 
has often been inspected is the amount of international cooperation and conflict 
(Hastedt and Knickrehm, 1991: 57). 
Measuring international conflicts in a scientific fashion has a recent history. 
Lewis Fry Richardson is accepted as the founder of scientific research on conflict 
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and research; other important early contributors were Quincy Wright and Pitirim A. 
Sorokin (Cioffi-Revilla, 1990: 2-3). Charles McClelland is given credit for having 
woven the traditional method of diplomatic history with the quantitative analysis of 
the behavioral school in the 1960s as events data (Schrodt, 1995: 151). "Riding the 
behavioral wave that swept the post-war generation of social sciences, the event-data 
movement has sought to advance the theory and practice of international politics" 
(Duffy, 1994: 147). 
Merritt says that there are two dimensions in the current attention to events: 
the approach and the unit of analysis (1994: 5-6). For the unit of analysis, the 
question involves what actors to use: state-actors or others. The approaches are also 
two-fold: A generic-behavior approach takes into consideration all events while an 
event specific approach starts from the outcome and works backwards. Schrodt 
expresses similar views when he says that there are two approaches: actor-oriented 
data sets and episode-oriented sets (1995: 152). 
The major events data projects are Rudolph J. Rummel's Dimensionality of 
Nations (DON) project, Charles A. McClelland's World Event Interaction Survey 
(WEIS); Edward E. Azar's Conflict and Peace Data Bank (COPDAB), Charles F. 
Hermann's Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) project, Ernst 
B. Haas et al. 's Managing Interstate Conflict (MIC), and Russell J. Leng's Behavioral 
Correlates of War (BCOW). 
WEIS, COPDAB and CREON are actor-oriented data sets. BCOW is a 
major episode-oriented data set. However, these are not the only data sets available. 
There are various smaller data sets available (Schrodt, 1995: 152-56 ). The South 
African Foreign Events Data (SAFED) of Koos van Wyk and Sarah Radloff is one 
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such example.6 While most of the major projects have been around since the Cold 
War, there are also newer projects, e.g., the Global Event Data System (GEDS) and 
Kansas Event Data System (KEDS), which rely on computers for coding. 
An event has been defined in similar fashion by the different projects. The 
least common denominator being an issue, action, and actors (sender and targets) 
(Merritt, 1994: 22). In a similar fashion, we define event as an action from one actor 
(sender) to others (target/targets) on a specified issue that is deemed to be 
newsworthy. We code each event by four variables: time (i.e., date), sender (i.e., 
initiator), target (i.e., recipient), and event classification on a six-score scale ranging 
from extremely cooperative moves to overt hostile moves. 
Events data has been extensively used in the study of foreign policy analysis 
(see Schrodt, 1995: 156-160). It has been utilized for the study of superpower 
interactions (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990), influence strategies in interstate 
conflicts (Leng, 1993; Leng, 1998), crisis early warning capabilities (Schrodt and 
Gerner, 1997), and environmental change and conflict (Savaiano and Schrodt, 1997). 
This piece studying Turkey's interactions with Greece and Syria through events data 
adds to the ever-growing list of topics studied by events data and demonstrates that 
events data is useful for the analysis of Turkish foreign policy. 
E. Outline 
The next chapter pinpoints important work pertaining to our study. We will 
investigate the state of Turkish-Greek and Turkish-Syrian literature with an emphasis 
on recent works relevant to the issues under investigation. We also discuss works 
utilizing (or not) content analysis in Turkish foreign policy. An attempt will be 
For demonstration of the data-set as well as its utility in the study of South African foreign 
policy see van Wyk and Radloff. 1993. 
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made to show that systematic studies are lacking. 
The third chapter presents the research design. It includes information about 
the data used, unit of analysis, pilot test, coding system, coding process, reliability, 
and the types of measurement. 
The fourth chapter offers the findings. In a nutshell, the questions inspect 
Turkish foreign policy activity in the 1990s and its approaches to the issues (Aegean 
Sea, Cyprus, Security and Water). Two other problems that will be investigated are 
case-specific topics: The effects of Holbrooke's mediation in 1996 on Cyprus 
problem and the effects of increased Turkish-Israeli relations since 1996 on Turkish-
Syrian relations. The value of content analysis for the study of Turkish foreign 
policy will be determined. A general overview of relations in the 1990s between the 
actors will be presented as seen from the data. 
In the fifth chapter, a summary and comparison of the findings along with the 
implications of this study will be offered. 
The final chapter delineates future areas of study. 
14 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
From the point of Turkish foreign policy literature, the issues with Greece 
have been studied more than other issues. Turkish-Greek relations have received 
more attention than Turkish-Syrian relations. The importance of Aegean Sea and 
Cyprus is clearly shown in a publication of the Ministry of National Defense: White 
Paper Defense 1998 deals with both issues under a separate chapter ( 1998 ). 
However, no mention of Syria occurs while matters of internal security, international 
terrorism, and PKK are discussed. 
Of the view that Greece occupies more attention than it deserves in Turkish 
foreign policy is Bilge (1996) who bases this situation on Greece's constant attempts 
to hurt Turkey. He maintains the differences are due to the fact that the Greeks base 
their foreign policy on the 'Great Idea' or Megali Idea (which can be defined as the 
establishment of a Greek empire or the resurrection of the Byzantium empire) while 
the Turks base it on the dictum associated to Atatlirk, 'Peace at Home and Peace in 
the World' which is openly espoused by different Turkish ministries including the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense. Another author who believes 
that Greek policies on Cyprus are of an aggressive nature while those of the Turks 
are of a peaceful nature is Gtirkan (retired General) ( 1994: 140). This view is clearly 
articulated in his article ( 1994) on how the decision to use force in Cyprus was 
reached by Turkish decision-makers and the military application of the decision. 
15 
Yet, Greek authors also point to the aggressiveness of Turkish policies as 
seen in Platias's work, "Greece's Strategic Doctrine: In Search of Autonomy and 
Deterrence" (1991). Veremis says that Greeks support the territorial status quo in 
the Aegean Sea while the Turks are challenging it (1998: 10). Along the same line, 
Prodromou (1998) depicts Turkey as the main cause for the failure of reintegration 
talks in Cyprus. Not to be outdone, Greek hostility is mentioned by Ergtivenr; who 
also points out the relevance of the adage, "If you want peace, you should be 
prepared for war" which sums up the important role played by the military in 
guarding Turkey's vital interests (1998: 40, 37). Ergtivenr; also says that it is 
Turkey's geography which gives Turkey its special significance (1998: 41-42). 
Adding the finishing touch to this debate on aggressiveness, Ayman's application of 
cognitive theory in the Aegean dispute demonstrates that the actors only take account 
of the other's hostile actions (1998: 301-319). She says that Turkey's Aegean policy 
is based on two factors: deterrence and negotiations. The first is reinforced through 
its declarations of casus belli and the second is seen in its demands for a package 
deal. 
In the beginning of the 1990s, it was expected that as in the previous decade, 
the shared continental shelf of the two countries would be the main point of 
discussion in the relations between Turkey and Greece. Bo1Ukba~1 in "The Turco-
Greek Disputes: Issues, Policies and Prospects" goes so far as to suggest that the 
territorial sea dispute was playing second fiddle to the continental shelf dispute 
( 1992: 38 ). Following a review of the problems, he concludes that the disputants 
view the content of the disputes and the means to solve them differently (Boltikba~1, 
1992: 49). Hickok (1998), in a detailed review, shows that the Kardak crisis 
demonstrated in 1996 that an islet in the Aegean Sea could strain Turkish-Greek 
relations to the utmost. He says that it was not American intervention but Turkish 
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military projection that decided the flow of events (Hickok, 1998: 134). The Turkish 
side fears that changes will result in the Aegean Sea becoming a Greek lake and this 
fear receives much impetus from the increased armament of the Greek islands which 
the Turkish side believes is against the Lausanne Agreement and many other treaties 
signed by the two parties. 
A number of authors have suggested that external threats bring the two 
countries together and without a hostile overlooming presence, an improvement will 
not occur (Clogg, 1991; and Birand, 1991 ). Veremis also points towards external 
measures, such as the constraints caused by the Cold War and external threats, and 
adds domestic priorities, such as economic reform, that could lead toward detente 
(1998: 17). Couloumbis and Klarevas use a level of analysis approach in order to 
come up with proposals and find that reduction in tensions is possible (1997). 
Dealing with the detente between the Soviets and Americans, Evangelista 
(1991) pointed out that the atmosphere would not contribute positively to the 
relations between Turks and Greeks. However, he does say that international 
dialogue that pushes for common-security thinking instead of the current zero-sum 
thinking would be more useful (Evangelista, 1991: 152). 
A year before the declaration of independence of TRNC, Rauf Denkta~ 
correctly emphasized the importance of Cyprus in Turkish-Greek relations by 
uttering, "Cyprus continues to be the fulcrum on which the Turkey-Cyprus-Greece 
triangle is delicately balanced" (1982: 108). Since the 1950s, Deringil says that the 
issue of Cyprus is the most problematic one (1992: 5). This is a view also put 
forward by Stearns (l992) and Lesser (1993). As the situation was bad enough in 
1964 to warrant the placement of United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and 
the Turkish side portrays the era between 1963 and 197 4 as a period of captivity 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1998b: 6), these views are warranted. However, Henze 
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is of the opinion that as all the actors favor the current structure, Cyprus has become 
a politically marginal issue (1993: 12). Veremis qualifies that view by saying that 
the Turks are happy with the situation prevalent in Cyprus but the Greek Cypriots 
want unity (1998: 10). 
An important publication is Tozun Bahcheli's Greek-Turkish Relations Since 
1955. He says that the most important issues, in respective order, are Cyprus and the 
Aegean Sea. He sums up the history of the relationship as being one of "grievance 
and mistrust" (Bahcheli, 1990: 189). On the issue of Cyprus, he points out that the 
Cypriots are not as subordinate to the mainlanders as believed. In the Aegean Sea 
dispute, he says that it is the conflicting national interests which lie at the core. 
While intercommunal gatherings between the Cypriots regularly took place in 
the aftermath of Turkey's 1974 intervention in Cyprus, following an attempted coup 
d'etat by Greece against Greek Cypriot leader Archbishop Makarios (because the 
Junta ruling in Greece perceived him as being anti-Junta and socialist), problems 
over ties to the mainlands, the three freedoms (of movement, settlement, and 
ownership of property) and government types for Cyprus resulted in dead-locks. 
The Turks worrying about marginalization (which were augmented by Greek 
demands for full implementation of the three freedoms, loose relations to the 
mainlands, and a central, strong government) wanted close ties with the mainlands 
and a weak, central government as well as partial implementation of three freedoms 
at most. The need for security is not properly addressed. 
Among others, Sir David Hannay and Richard Holbrooke attempted to 
mediate between the sides but usually to no avail. The Greek Cypriot government's 
decision in the mid-l 990s to buy S-300 surface-to-air missiles from Russia resulted 
in Turkish threats to destroy them. The atmosphere somewhat calmed down when 
the Greek Cypriots decided not to place them on Cyprus. 
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The amount of articles on the peace initiatives between Turks and Greeks, 
especially on the Cyprus conflict, are numerous. Boltikba~1 looks at the Cyprus 
initiatives in two articles. In an article covering UN Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali's 1992 initiative, besides pointing out that Boutros-Ghali was too optimistic, he 
says that differences of opinion between the two communities on what constitutes an 
acceptable solution resulted in failure of the talks (Boltikba~1, 1995: 461, 479). 
Insecurity and mistrust constituting the key elements. In a more extensive article, 
Boltikba~1 (1998) covers the UN involvement in the period between 1954 and 1996 
and says that mutual suspicion lies at the heart of the matter. He says that while the 
UN has generally maintained tranquillity on the island, it has not been able to cajole 
the parties to a peaceful settlement and the issue is not any "riper" than before 
(Boltikba~1, 1998: 429-430). 
Couloumbis and Klarevas look upon Cyprus as being the most prickly issue 
between Turks and Greeks but say that the problem is '"ripe'" (1997: 53) meaning 
that the parties want to reach a settlement. This is in contrast to Sir Hannay, UK 
Special Representative for Cyprus, who has said, "The sad truth is that in Cyprus 
today there is a lack of trust and confidence in the good faith of the other side which 
undermines the best intentioned efforts to reach agreement" (1997: 35 ). Prodromou 
(1998) maintains that Turkey must be engaged more decisively by the EU and the 
US if the impasse in Cyprus is to be overcome. Keashly and Fisher ( 1990) develop a 
contingency approach to third party intervention in regional conflicts and illustrate 
the conceptual analysis through Cyprus. They point to the shortcomings of the 
various efforts and point specifically to lack of coordination and inappropriate timing 
(Keashly and Fisher, 1990: 452-453). Evriviades and Bourantonis also indicate the 
deficiencies of the peace methods utilized in Cyprus (1994). Onal (1997), in a 
policy paper, indicates that while most of the peace efforts have concentrated on the 
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issue of Cyprus, the Aegean Sea issue cannot be ignored and that it has actually 
caused more crises. He says that the sides should address each other's security 
w01Ties and calls for more NATO involvement (Unal, 1997). 
A study, using cointegration and causality tests, examines Greek-Turkish 
arms procurement and concludes that an arms race between the NA TO members 
exists (Kollias and Makrydakis, 1997: 355-379). The volatility of the relations has 
resulted in a number of works calling upon NATO to become a catalyst in the 
resolution. Greece and Turkey have been for almost half a century within the same 
camp and alliance. While alliances also function to sort out differences within the 
members, this was not the case for the Turks and Greeks. Participation in one of the 
most important collective defense organizations in history has not done enough to 
smooth out differences. Stearns (1992) in a policy-oriented research suggests that a 
non-aggression pact guaranteed by NA TO could be the answer. He reaches this 
view because of the emphasis put on territorial security in the official propaganda of 
the two countries and goes on to suggest that the United States should do more to 
curb the arms race (Stearns, 1992: 103, 151 ). In a similar research, Brown ( 1991) 
also says that the North Atlantic Alliance could play a major role in the solution. 
Brown points out that NA TO was not designed for solving problems between 
members but that the incident of March 1987, when Greeks and Turks came closest 
to confrontation since 197 4, was an indication of the omnipresence of friction 
between the two allies (1991: 16, 127, 162). Pisiotis in "L'OT AN et la persistance 
du conflit greco-turc" besides uttering the familiar claim that the parties will only 
unite against a common aggressor, also makes an interesting remark that stipulates 
that as the Turks want to be European and the Aegean Sea is European, Turks want 
the Aegean Sea (1993-1994: 914, 908). Haass (1988) and McDonald (1988) under 
the same volume describe Turkey and Greece's importance in the Alliance as well as 
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the disputes of the countries but suggest that NATO should be cautious. Unlike most 
authors, Krebs (1999) believes that NA TO has also contributed to the tensions 
between the sides by eliminating the immediate Soviet threat, providing arms, and 
altering the balance of power between the parties and allowing them to concentrate 
on regional interests. However, Krebs also concedes that the fact that war never 
broke out is also due to NATO (1999: 369). 
Laipson (1991), reviewing the policies of US administrations on Greek-
Turkish relations in the post-1974 era, says that there is no consensus within the US 
and predicts that if the countries are seen as insignificant, their supporters will face a 
harder time in influencing and engaging US institutions. Carley ( 1997) somewhat 
overestimates the importance of Cyprus for US foreign policy by maintaining that 
the US was always interested in it. In Cyprus and International Peacemaking, 
Mirbagheri says that the United States has shifted "out of its sluggish bottom gear" 
and the appointment of Richard Holbrooke to Cyprus was a strong indication of their 
search for a end to the Cyprus problem (1998: 153). He also says that talks over 
Cyprus's accession to the EU have resulted in more peacemaking efforts but he 
points out the importance of Turkey on the island as being the main outside power 
(Mirbagheri, 1998: 152, 161). While the EU and NATO are mentioned as third-
parties for Cyprus, only the UN is a possibility according to Carley (1997: 19). 
There are also a number of authors who examine the role of the European 
Community/European Union (EC/EU) in the Cyprus conflict. Pushing for 
international dialogue under the auspices of the EC/EU is Meinardus ( 1991) who 
wants a more active and constructive role. However, Stephanou and Tsardanides say 
that the EC/EU cannot mediate because one of the disputants is a member (1991). In 
their work on the EC factor, they maintain that the domestic political situation in 
Turkey following the coup d'etat is to blame for Turkish-EC relations and not 
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Greece (Stephanou and Tsardanides, 1991: 211) but also assert that the Greek role 
could become more decisive when other barriers are solved. Inspecting the ethnic 
conflict between the parties on Cyprus, Joseph points to the polarizing effect of 
ethnopolitics in Cyprus and is of the view that the accession of Cyprus to the EU is 
an excellent opportunity (1997: 129, 137). Kramer (1997) looks at the precarious 
position of the European Union in the events leading up to the Greek Cypriot 
government's accession talks and mentions the positions of the main actors involved 
in the Cyprus problem. However, his call for EU accession negotiations not to be 
concluded before a solution is found to the Cyprus problem has been largely ignored 
(Kramer, 1997: 30). Following an examination of whether EU expansion into 
Cyprus would be good for the island, F1rak (1998) concludes negatively. She also 
says that Turkey has had no real policy on Cyprus and that the relations between the 
Turks is closer than the relations between the Greeks which poses questions on the 
sovereignty of TRNC (F1rat, 1998: 279-81). Following the Luxembourg summit (of 
December 1997), Jenkins says that the EU cannot imagine that Turkey views them as 
impartial and that Turkey became more defensive and less conciliatory, especially 
towards Greece, following international setbacks (1998: 13). 
Following a year (1996) marked by confrontation Bahcheli and Rizopoulous 
( 1996-1997) examine possible options. They say that any consent will necessitate 
the approval of the majority of the two communities. According to them, the 
Turkish Cypriots are willing to give up territory for a deal with the EU and as the 
majority of Greek Cypriots recognize that they have to share the island, a positive 
outcome could follow for the island (Bahcheli and Rizopoulous, 1996-1997: 29-39). 
Domestic factors have also played an important role in the relations as the 
findings in this work also maintain. Turkish Prime Minister Ozal maintained that 
greater cooperation was prevented through the bureaucracy in both countries 
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(Birand, 1991: 34). A work examining the domestic influences is Pridham's 
"Linkage Politics Theory and the Greek-Turkish Rapprochement" (1991) in which 
the author approaches the post-1987 relationship through linkage politics theory. He 
concludes that domestic pressures (particularly on Greek Prime Minister 
Papandreou) hindered greater cooperation (Pridham, 1991: 86 ). Keri dis (1998 ), in a 
study on Greek domestic politics, tries to show how they affect relations between 
Turkey and Greece. He clearly shows that domestic politics influences relations 
when he says that though Prime Minister Simitis wants accommodation, he is 
constrained by personal factors and party politics (Keridis, 1998: 17 ). Keri dis 
believes that Greece has been unable to create and implement policies but since 1995 
he says that Greek foreign policy has become more flexible and 'mature' which is 
contradicted by recent Greek actions in support of Abdullah bcalan ('Avenger') and 
the PKK (1998: 23-24). Showing the precarious nature of Turkish politics and the 
national consensus on Turkish foreign policy, Kramer (after his examination of 
Greece's position in broader Turkish foreign policy) maintains that Turkish 
governments would need considerable tradeoffs for concess10ns O 991). 
Coufoudakis, following his comparison of the foreign policies of Greece's two major 
parties, asserts that there is continuity in Greek foreign policy and says that in the 
foreseeable future, the cycle of 'confrontation-negotiation-confrontation' will 
continue (1991: 54). This element of continuity has been also expressed in 
discussions of Turkish foreign policy on matters concerning Greece, as can be see in 
Former Greek Ambassador to Ankara, Nezeretis's declarations ( 1999: A8 ). 
At a Conference on Aegean issues in Turkey, the participants concluded that 
any settlement had to include the political elements surrounding the Aegean Sea as 
well as its uniqueness and gave a position of secondary importance to the evolving, 
ambiguous international law on maritime boundaries (Ta~han, 1995). At the 
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Conference, Aquarone came right to the point when she said, "The Challenge is now 
to move beyond legal correctness: to overcome stereotypes and define a new 
relationship which would incorporate the two countries' wider concerns and provide 
then with space to move into" (1995: 56). Elsewhere, Keridis (1998) also says that 
while international law is important, actors should be prepared to go beyond it. 
This is not to say that there are no other disputes between the Greeks and 
Turks. For the Turks, the Turkish minority of Western Thrace constitutes another 
topic as can be seen in Oran's publication (1996). 
From this literature review on Turkish-Greek relations, some conclusions can 
be made: Greece and Turkey both see the other as threatening and aggressive. 
Domestic politics in both countries affect the relations between the countries. More 
international attention was paid to Cyprus than to the Aegean Sea. Mediation efforts 
between the sides have been inconclusive. The EU is no longer a serious contender 
for the role of mediation. The UN will continue to be the major player in Cyprus; 
NATO has to assume a greater role in matters concerning Greece and Turkey. The 
absence of an external threat resulted in the sides becoming more antagonistic 
towards each other. The Cypriot communities are not the lackeys of the mainland 
countries. The relations between the sides can be characterized as one of hostility 
with the occasional positive or negative factor thrown in. Most of these conclusions 
emerge from publications of similar nature: policy, opinion papers. Content analysis 
is lacking and while systematic studies exist, they are few. The general lack of 
systematic approaches, such as content analysis, can also be seen in the literature on 
Turkish-Syrian relations. 
An overview of Turkish-Syrian relations indicates that there have been few 
studies solely on this subject. Rather, this relationship was mainly covered within 
the context of Turkey's relationships with the Middle Eastern countries or as part of a 
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study on a subject such as water in the Middle East. As the examples given below 
show water and security matters are generally tied. Almost no work fails to mention 
them both. Another discussion matter, Hatay, has received less attention because 
Syrian capabilities limit any possibility of change. Syria has not reconciled itself to 
the loss of Hatay which chose to become part of Turkey in 1939 following a 
plebiscite. Syria refuses to accept this situation and portrays it as a Syrian province. 
Dalacoura's article, "Turkey and the Middle East in the 1980s," examines the 
internal and external factors that have influenced Turkish-Middle Eastern relations 
(1990). She concludes that while Turkey became more involved in the region, its 
interest in the region did not greatly increase. Altum~1k (1998) says a key factor for 
greater Turkish involvement in the Middle East has been the redefinition of the 
national security problem which has resulted in the end of the division between 
internal and external politics: The external threat comes from the south and the 
internal threats of Islamic fundamentalism and the PKK receive support from the 
Middle East or the south (1998: 350). The increasing military involvement in 
Turkish foreign policy has been pointed out by Ulman ( 1998 ). For him this is 
because the military sees foreign policy as too important to be left to the politicians. 
In the Turkish-Syrian showdown in October 1998, the military was the key player. 
In one of the few studies devoted to relations among Israel, Syria and 
Turkey, Gresh (1998) points out that it is not regional cooperation but realpolitik 
that is the order of the day in the Middle East. He describes the relations between 
the non-Arabs as one of military axis and Damascus's attempts to counter this 
movement as unsuccessful (Gresh, 1998: 202-203). Waxman, in a policy paper, is 
correct in pointing out that Turkey and Israel share many reasons why they should be 
close but his usage of the term, 'balance of power' is misplaced as these countries do 
not need each other to deter Syria (1999: 25-32 ). 
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Muslih maintains that Syria perceives Turkey as the lackey of the West and 
the United States in particular (1996: 113-130). This view, he believes, can be 
improved as a consequence of the amelioration of relations among Syria, Israel, and 
the United States. This contradicts the Turkish opinion that such a situation would 
lead Syria to become more hostile. Olson's article, "Turkey-Syria Relations Since 
the Gulf War: Kurds and Water" is one of the few works entirely on the relations 
between the two neighbors (1997). Following a comprehensive review of relations 
since the Gulf War, he points to 1996 as the year when relations hit a new low and 
this was despite the presence of (the pro-Arab) Welfare government in Ankara. Yet, 
he says that Turkey needs Syrian (and Iranian) cooperation to combat PKK terrorism 
(Olson, 1997: 189). Bayaz1t (1998), a retired General, points to the external forces 
behind the Kurdish question and says this is done so as to subdue Turkey. In the 
same volume, Kiri~\:i accepts the reality of the Kurdish question, and says that 
besides making Turkey appear aggressive, it also influences Turkish foreign policy 
(1998: 73, 77). 
Robins ( 1991) mentions that Turkish decision-makers look upon Syria as 
being the most problematic of its neighbors. However, he points out that while Syria 
is using illegal groups against Turkey to gain leverage on the water issue, Turkey is 
still unaffected by Syrian (and Iraqi) concerns about its water policies (Robins, 1991: 
51, 95). On many occasions, charges of sponsoring terrorism have been leveled at 
Syria. Turkey has been accusing Syria of giving support to illegal groups within 
Turkey for decades. This is withstanding the fact that agreements exist between 
them calling for the extradition of criminals. Direct Syrian support to terror was 
witnessed in 1982 when the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia 
(ASALA) members arriving from Syria caused havoc and bloodshed at Ankara's 
Esenboga Airport. However, it was only in 1983 that Turkish officials publicly 
26 
denounced Syria. The reason was Syrian permission to terrorists to establish bases 
in Syria and parts of Lebanon under Syrian control (Boltikba~1, 1993: 17). 
The PKK occupies a central role in Turkey's relations with Syria. The PKK 
is unique among the Kurdish groups in the Middle East in that it was Pan-Kurdish, 
was based on ideology (and not tribalism) from its inception, and demanded 
complete independence for much of its existence (Fuller, 1993a: 115-116 ). Abdullah 
bcalan headed the organization from the beginning (usually from his residence in 
Damascus). He has acknowledged Syrian support many times. In fact, the Syrians 
openly told Prime Minister Ozal during his visit in 1987 (which resulted in a Mutual 
Security Accord7 being signed) that bcalan was a political refugee. 
Many authors point out that the PKK card is used for the Euphrates problem. 
Boli.ikba~1 (1993) points towards this view following his examination of the relations 
between Syria and Turkey. However, he also adds Hatay and the anti-Turkishness of 
the Syrian regime as two other issues that have to be addressed and summarizes 
Syrian policy as one based on supporting terrorism, revising borders, and believing 
that time is on their side (Boli.ikba~1, 1993: 32, 17). Fuller (l 993b) in "Turkey's New 
Eastern Orientation" takes the view that the Syrians are using the Kurds as an 
instrument and that if Syrian negative images towards Turkey changes, a future 
amelioration in the relations could take place. Fuller also illuminates the intricate 
differences between the Turks and Arabs and how history, culture and social factors 
have meant that the two peoples have followed different lines ( l 993b: 49-51 ). 
One article of particular interest to emerge from a book which examines the 
effects of the Kurdish question on Turkey is Olson's "The Kurdish Question and 
Turkey's Foreign Policy Toward Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq since the Gulf War" in 
In one protocol, Syria promises to cut its support to terrorist organizations operating against 
Turkey. In the other protocol, Turkey pledges a minimum of 500 cubic meters per second of water 
from the Euphrates River. 
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which he maintains that Turkey concluded a series of security agreements with its 
neighbors when it faced the possibility of an independent Kurdish state in Northern 
Iraq from 1993 onwards (1996: 86). On the section on Turkish-Syrian relations, 
besides offering the recent history of the relations, he explores the Turkish decision 
not to take moves which would have shown its displeasure with Syrian assistance to 
PKK in 1995 and 1996. His two-fold answer (not attacking an Arab state which was 
improving its relations with Israel and the possibilities of failure) does not tell the 
whole story as it ignores the fact that Turkish foreign policy has generally shied 
away from entanglements in the Middle East (Olson, 1996: 92-93 ). 
Of the opinion that the Kurdish issue is the most important national challenge 
facing Turkey is Rouleau (1993: 122). Taking a larger perspective, Fuller says it is 
"central for the Middle East in the new world order" (1993a: 121). Following an 
examination of the status of the Kurds, which he maintains is the best in Turkey but 
still not satisfactory, Fuller (1993a) says that the options (including repression and 
federation) will all have dramatic consequences for the Middle East. In a study on 
the future choices for Turkey, Tunander (1995) reviews what the breakup of the 
Soviet Union meant for Turkey, and says that Turkey can choose to become a 
'national fortress' or an 'Euro-Asian Centre.' Comparing the Czechoslovak breakup 
with Turkey, he says that Turkey has much more reason than even the Czechs to 
"amputate" South-East Anatolia (Tunander, 1995: 422-423 ). His assertion that 
Turkey would thus be ridding itself of its difficulties with the Syrians and Iraqis is 
far-fetched. Moreover, Pegg (1999) indicates that what happened between the 
Czechs and the Slovaks should be taken not as the rule but as the exception and that 
as the example of Greek Cypriots doing their utmost to stop the Turkish Cypriots 
from becoming recognized internationally shows, the decisions are not based on 
economics (1999: 145-146). 
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6ni~ (1995 ), in an article examining the key elements in Turkey's 
relationships, says that Turkish endeavors to assume the position of regional leader 
in the Middle East are risky. He also points out that Turkey is tied to Syria (and 
Iraq) through the issues of water and the Kurds (Oni~, 1995: 61 ). In a similar article, 
Mtifttiler-Bac (1996) shows that Turkey is using the Middle East (as an instrument) 
for its goal of acceptance to Europe. According to her, water and Kurdish 
insurgency are two of the elements that will be determining Turkey's futures 
(Mtifttiler-Bac, 1996: 265). 
The first water debate between Turkey and Syria was not over the Euphrates 
River but over a Syrian dam project on the Orantes (Asi) River which enters the 
Turkish province of Hatay from Syria in the 1950s. Turkey unilaterally announced 
that it would supply the others with 500 cubic meters per second of water in 1979 
and reiterated that amount in the Protocol of Economic Cooperation of 1987 with 
Syria. The massive GAP project (the Turkish acronym for Southeastern Anatolia 
Project which aims to play a major role in social, educational, and economical 
development of the southeastern and eastern parts of Turkey) commenced in 1983. 
Atattirk Dam occupies an important position in GAP. This was also the period when 
Syrian support to terrorism against Turkey was increasing. In January 1990, Turkey 
started to fill the Atattirk Dam's Reservoir. Despite prior announcements and 
increasing the flow to the downstream countries, this move caused great uproar in 
the downstream countries (especially in Iraq which called for trilateral agreements). 
It is expected that GAP will result in Syria receiving 11 cubic kilometers per year 
less water and that the flow of the Tigris will reduce by 6 cubic kilometers per year 
(Beschorner, 1992: 31 ). The downstream countries are also concerned about a 
deterioration in water quality. Syrian and Iraqi demands for higher quotas (around 
700 cubic meters per second) have not been accepted by Turkey who advocates 
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water efficiency. Turkey's initiatives such as 'Three Staged Plan for Optimum, 
Equitable, Reasonable Utilization of Waters of Tigris and Euphrates Basin' and 
Peace pipelines have not been taken seriously by others because of mistrust and the 
costs involved. It is unlikely that Syria will follow the calls for rational, optimal and 
fair use of water as well as to cooperate on information exchange as called upon by 
Turkey and the "Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational uses of 
International Water courses." This Convention by providing for a regulatory 
institution can constrain Turkey's ability to maneuver and Turkey was one of three 
countries which voted against it: downstream users were given privilege over the 
upstream countries and upstream countries' obligation to not take actions which 
could harm downstream countries was reiterated. 
Jouejati believes that an examination of the origins of the water crisis 
between Syria, Turkey and Iraq can pinpoint the hindrances and possible solutions. 
Political conflict and a lack of trust are two major obstacles; according to Jouejati 
(1996: 131-146). Also on water, Ohlsson (1995) in "The Role of Water and the 
Origins of Conflict" says that there are many problematic water issues throughout the 
world. The subject of dispute in the Euphrates Rivers Basin is over dams, reduced 
water flows, and salinization (Ohlsson, 1995: 1-28 ). 
In a detailed study entitled "GAP and the Water Conflict," <;arkoglu and Eder 
say that the debate is between water rights (downstream riparians position) and water 
management (Turkish position) and that domestic political economies along with 
delays in fulfillment of goals restrict solutions to the dispute (1998: 65, 68-69). 
Following a study of the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, Bagi~ ( 1997) maintains that while 
Turkey looks upon the GAP project as an economic issue, the downstream countries 
view it as a political issue. This has resulted in Turkey's 'Three Stage Plan' being 
rejected. Kut underscores the importance of water for Turkey's Middle-East politics 
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( 1994: 229). The paradox of Turkey is also demonstrated as Kut ( 1994) maintains 
that Turkey wanted to become important in the region but did not want to turn its 
water into a bargaining tool. 
Lowi ( l 995a), while comparing riparian disputes, comes to the conclusion 
that Turkey enjoys relative power in the Euphrates basin. This is not only because of 
its military capabilities but also because of its upstream riparian position. Thus, 
according to Lowi, Turkey has no incentive to discuss water quotas but the other 
riparian countries could manage to obtain concessions if Turkey came to the table 
(1995a: 59, 73-74). However, this last assertion seems quite unrealistic (a feat that 
Lowi accepts). In another publication, "Rivers of Conflict, Rivers of Peace," she 
again discusses the Euphrates River basin and examines how the Middle East process 
affects the water issues ( l 995b ). Lowi says that Turkey has an absolute advantage 
(militarily and riparian position-wise) but still stipulates a basin-wide detailed 
agreement as being the ideal solution (1995b: 127). Nonetheless, she says that the 
solutions to the political conflicts will have to come first. In "Bridging the Divide," 
Lowi (1993) considers the linkage between low and high politics in the case of the 
Israeli need for West Bank water. Lowi suggests that in cases where countries are 
foes in high politics, they are not likely to cooperate in low politics (1993: 135). In 
the case of Turkish-Syrian problem, such an assertion seems to be plausible. 
In a broad study covering all the major water disputes of the Middle East, 
Beschorner (1992) analyses what conditions can lead to conflict. She says that water 
disputes between Turkey, Syria and Iraq will not extend beyond verbal protests and 
that high politic issues will be more important (as mentioned also by Lowi). 
Gleick ( 1993) demonstrates the links between water and conflict. He says 
that water confrontations will probably not result in violent conflict but in political 
confrontations and maintains that scarcity, sharing of water supply between actors, 
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the relative power of actors, and the availability of alternative water sources 
determine how much water will result in strategic rivalry (Gleick, 1993: 84-85, 112). 
In a comprehensive study on water and peace in the Middle East, Hillel concludes 
that water has been politicized in the Middle East (1994 ). 
Looking at the water issue from a 'low politics' perspective, and particularly 
food security policy, Mazlum (1998) concludes that it is out of the question for 
Turkey to be the initiator of a conflict in this situation because everything is in its 
favor. He shows that the Arabs have not been forthcoming on Turkey's initiatives 
partly because of the way that they used oil in the 1970s which is making them feel 
uneasy over giving the control of water to another actor (Mazlum, 1998: 398 ). 
In a case study on 'the Euphrates and Tigris hydropolitical security complex' 
Schulz (1995) says that while there is enough water for Turkey, Syria and Iraq, 
problems of management and political disputes cause tensions. Yet, ecological 
interdependence could be crucial for regional cooperation as well as to show the 
importance of the water dimension in security studies (Schulz, 1995: 120-121 ). 
Following an examination of hydropolitics and hydro-diplomacy of the Euphrates 
and Tigris rivers, Kut concludes that the problems of insecurity, instability and 
mistrust resulted in an impasse in water negotiations but that Turkey seems to have 
shelved the Three-Stage Plan for a silent but aggressive approach ( 1993: 14). 
In a policy paper that was published before the unrealized Middle East Water 
Summit planned for Istanbul in 1991, Starr points towards its importance and says 
that peace could perhaps be obtained through water cooperation ( 1991: 36 ). Bilen 
(1993) offers a perspective analysis of the Euphrates-Tigris basin and methods to 
improve irrigation in GAP and suggests that well-mediated technical approaches 
could be the solution. 
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Theoretical works on water conflict have been few. Two works utilizing 
game theory by Gilner are of interest. Gilner uses a simple two person signalling 
game where he says that an agreement over the Euphrates is impossible and that 
Turkey's policy is unaffected by long-term and short-term balances, while Syria is 
affected (1998: 204, 203 ). In another article on water and terrorism, Gilner (1997) 
analyses issue linkage through game theory and challenges such common 
assumptions as Turkey being more powerful just because of its geographical 
position. Analyzing the unilateral concessions that could be made, his results 
indicate that while Turkish costs are higher, Syrian impatience over future benefits 
are higher and that it wants an agreement (Gilner, 1997: 115 ). 
Based on the existing literature, certain conclusions can be made about 
Turkish-Syrian relations. Turkey has for a long time wanted to keep out of Middle 
Eastern affairs and even when it became more involved, it was a half-hearted effort. 
Turkey believes that Syrian support for terrorism directed at Turkey is crucial for the 
terrorists and that it needs Syrian cooperation to wipe out terrorism. The water issue 
has become deeply politicized. The countries will not fight over water but problems 
over water can further disrupt relations. The sides are at odds over how water should 
be used. While Turkey has many advantages in the water issue, this does not mean 
that Syria has no cards of its own. It is unlikely that the countries will cooperate in 
low or high politics. Unless social cohesion occurs in Turkey, its adversaries will 
have ample opportunities to use Turkish internal matters as a means for their own 
ends, as demonstrated by the Syrian support extended to separatist Kurds. There is 
clearly an issue linkage between water and terrorism. While cooperation in low 
politics is believed to lead to cooperation in high politics, cooperation even in low 
politics is not considered possible. Most of the methodologies applied here have 
been similar. Many articles provide detailed histories and proposals for various 
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actors. Articles utilizing content analysis are lacking but unlike in the Turkish-Greek 
case, there seems to be a greater variety in the methodologies used, e.g., game 
theory, which has led to a more diverse range of findings. 
As seen above in the sections reviewing the literature on Turkish-Greek 
relations and Turkish-Syrian relations, a lack of systematic studies exists. Turkish 
foreign policy's literature is mostly based on policy and opinion pieces. Empirical 
and theoretical studies are underutilized. This is not to say that there are no such 
studies: Kollias and Stelios's "Is there a Greek-Turkish Arms Race?: Evidence from 
Cointegration and Causality Tests" (1997) and Sezgin's "Country Survey X: 
Defence Spending in Turkey" (1997) are two such recently published articles. 
It is clear that while academics have researched, analyzed and published 
many works on Turkey, most of these articles are not radically different in their 
methodologies or in their findings (see Aydin and Alkan, 1997). It is vital that 
different methods be used even if the findings are the same. If nothing else, these 
findings will be more conclusive. 
However, the findings of under-used methodologies have certainly brought 
some interesting results. This is the case with Volkan and ltzkowitz's work, Greeks 
and Turks where the authors (1994) provide a psychological analysis of the relations 
between the countries. The aim of Volkan and Itzkowitz is to "analyze Turkish-
Greek relations in order to illuminate their psychological foundations and to explain 
irrational attitudes while differentiating fantasy and unconscious phenomena from 
reality" (1994: xvii). They maintain that the Greeks have suffered a continuous 
series of traumas such as the devastating loss of Constantinople which lies at the 
heart of the Megali Idea (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994: 37). 
The application of content analysis to Turkey's external relations is almost 
non-existent. Kotzageorgis's "Armed Forces Intervention in Post-War Turkey: A 
Methodological Approach of Greek Newspapers Through Political Analyses" (1992) 
and <;aph's "Newsweek and Time Coverage of the 1974 Cyprus" (1988) are two of 
the examples that come close. These articles have a limited scope. Therefore, it is 
not wrong to conclude that some methodologies have been underutilized and even 
when used have had extremely limited scopes. 
Inspecting the literature which utilizes events data for the study of Turkey's 
foreign policy reveals that the use of events data for analyzing Turkish foreign policy 
has not occurred. While events data have been applied on Turkey for some of the 
disputes it was involved in, those works (e.g., BCOW) were not studying Turkish 
foreign policy. Rather, Turkey's interactions were one of many interactions studied 
for the purpose of understanding such topics as the outbreak of crises and success of 
negotiation and mediation efforts. In a recent study using KEDS data sets, Turkey's 
interactions within the context of the Yugoslavia civil war are being included. 
However, Turkey is not the country under the spotlight. 
As the various works mentioned above have shown, events data were used in 
numerous different manners for different purposes. The South African Event Data 
set (SAFED) also demonstrates that its usage is not limited to the United States of 
America. A similar set can be created for Turkey. 
A study of Turkey's negotiating style through the usage of content analysis 
has not taken place. Beriker and Druckman ( 1996) used the Bargaining Process 
Analysis (as well as simulations) in a study on power asymmetries in bargaining 
involving Turkey during the Lausanne Peace Conference of J 923. 
It is clear that a greater amount of empirical and theoretical studies are 
necessary. This study applies content analysis, a systematic approach, to issues 
occupying a central role in Turkish foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. Data 
Content analysis comprises of three activities: design, execution, and report 
(Krippendorff, 1980: 169). This chapter discusses the research design and execution. 
The news source, coding process, limitations and delimitations compromise some of 
the subjects explained here. 
In events data, the source of information plays an important role. 
International news wire services offer a more comprehensive coverage of world 
interactions than newspapers sources (which suffer from problems of limited space 
and resource) (Davies and McDaniel, 1994: 64 ). Reuters is one of the leaders in this 
service. Reuters has journalists throughout the world and these journalists are 
usually local reporters who also work for local news sources (Davies and McDaniel, 
1994: 64). It has been used by many projects. GEDS and KEDS depend on it 
extensively. Philip Schrodt has used it in numerous occasions with Deborah J. 
Gerner in "Empirical Indicators of Crisis Phase in the Middle East, 1979-1995" 
( 1997) and with Scott Sanaiano in "Environmental Change and Conflict: Analyzing 
the Ethiopian Famine of 1984-1985" (1997). Consequently, articles from Reuters 
were chosen as the data set for this work. 
The Boolean search terms were respectively 'Greece and Turkey' and 'Syria 
and Turkey' for the period between the beginning of 1990 and the end of 1998. 
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These queries retrieved all the articles on Turkey's relations with Greece and Syria. 
So as to minimize repetition only articles of Reuters origin were retrieved. This also 
reduced the workload and eliminated technical problems as to whether articles from 
non-Reuters origin could be used with those of Reuters origin. 
Articles from Reuters were obtained and copies were made of them on disk 
(for backup purposes) and paper (for actual use). However, the population was 
further limited because not every article was relevant to the issue being studied. 
Therefore, the fact that an article contained references to both Turkey and one of the 
actors being studied did not immediately bring it under the spotlight. For example, 
an article could be on pollution and be making references to Turkey and Greece or 
an article could be relevant for the issue of Cyprus and not the issue of Aegean Sea, 
e.g., periodic UN mediation efforts between the Cypriot communities. For a 
sentence to be coded, thus, the litmus test was relevance to the issue being studied. 
B. Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis is the event. Information supplied by Reuters on a 
relevant international event constitutes each event coding. As mentioned previously, 
an event coding is made up of four variables: date, initiator, recipient and coding 
category. Utilizing an article in its entirety was not practical. Since the first 
sentence of a news article contains the main idea in most types of journalistic types 
of writing, attention was concentrated on it. An examination of journalistic writing 
shows that much repetition takes place. This is usually done to give background 
information to the reader who might not be knowledgeable on the subject-matter. 
For example, in the Turkish-Greek case over Aegean Sea, many articles make 
reference to historic events such as the 1987 crisis and the 197 4 events. So a phrase 
such as, "Relations between Greece and Turkey have been dogged for decades by 
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political enmities over Cyprus and rights in the Aegean Sea," would not be coded 
("Turkey: Turkey Appeals To U.N. Over Ethnic Turks In Greece," 1990). However, 
so as to avoid missing other important points mentioned in the articles, quotations 
(direct or indirect) were also taken; the qualifying element being that the statement 
must be of a different nature from that of the lead sentence. 
To summarize, for a sentence to be deemed codable, it has to be relevant to 
the issue, and present in the lead sentence or in a quotation (providing that the 
opening sentence did not already cover its subject). In cases where there were two 
articles or sentences of identical nature, they were either both discarded (if not 
relevant) or only one was coded so as to avoid coding the same event twice. The 
moves of private citizens are not included unless they are supported by their 
respective states. 
C. Pilot Test 
A pilot test was conducted on Turkish-Greek relations over the Cyprus issue 
for the years from 1996 onwards. This test supported the view that an examination 
could be conducted from a content analysis approach. Up to this point, it seemed 
that Terrence P. Hopmann's Negotiation Process Analysis (NPA) was to be used for 
the coding. 8 However, following the test, NPA was abandoned for a coding scale 
ranging from plus three to minus three. The main reason for this change was that 
Hopmann's typology was designed for verbatim transcripts. The difference in the 
types of text available was the deciding factor. A test conducted over the same 
subject again with events data showed that the new system was more suitable for the 
Coming two decades after the BPA (Bargaining Process Analysis). the NPA added new 
categories such as problem-solving behavior and procedural behavior. The original BPA system 
contained four categories of behavior: substantive behavior, strategic behavior. task behavior and 
affective behavior. Thomas Schelling's work being the idea behind the first two behaviors. 
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task. The final coding sheet contained columns to indicate the actors (from and to), 
the date, and the numerical score. 
D. Coding System 
Numerical weights were assigned to measure the direction and intensity of an 
event. The scale's range runs from the most peaceful (+3) to the most violent (-3) 
excluding 09 : 
Plus 3: A significant action towards peace is placed under this code. 
One example is an agreement between two states; 
Plus 2: This score captures less dramatic actions. Examples of this 
are movements of troops away from confrontation situations, meetings with the 
opposing side or with mediators, or "gestures that could be construed as a peace 
feeler" (Mooradian and Druckman, forthcoming: 7); 
Plus 1: Only verbal action of peaceful and positive nature is included 
under this code. Statements could be of the sort that praise the other side, 
acknowledge a common bond, declarations that the issue has to be solved and clarify 
the situation. 10 
Minus 1: Only verbal action of a violent and negative nature is included 
under this code. Comments that are threatening, derogatory and accusatory are all 
included; 
Minus 2: Dramatic actions that are hostile in nature to the other side or 
just short of violence are captured in this score. Not appearing at talks, moving 
The coding process used here is based on Moorad Mooradian and Daniel Druckman's "Hurting 
Stalemate or Mediation? The Conflict Over Nagomo-Karabakh. 1990-1995." forthcoming: 6-7. 
10 As zero scores would indicate no event. they were not included. It would complicate analysis 
and distort the statistics. Also, while a 'O' score means no event, it is possible that an event occurred 
but data were not available. The availability of data determined which events were to be analyzed 
in this study. See Mooradian and Druckman. forthcoming: 22. 
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troops in the form of military exercises, demonstrations of military capabilities, or 
bringing additional units into a crisis zone are some of the examples; 
Minus 3: This score captures acts of violence against the adversary. 
Some examples are actions causing direct physical harm to the other side and using 
military capabilities against the other side. 
The following Reuters sentences make up the data set and demonstrate the 
coding mechanism: 
April 17, 1992. Syria, accused by Ankara of supporting rebel Turkish Kurds, 
signed an anti-terrorism protocol with Turkey on Friday, Anatolian news 
agency said. (This sentence would be coded as plus 3 for both sides because 
there is an agreement between the parties). 
April 21, 1993. The prime ministers of Turkey and Greece held talks on 
Wednesday aimed at improving the often-strained relations between the two 
countries and both described the meeting as sincere. (This is an example of plus 
2 as the sides met). 
June 2, 1995. Turkish ships prepared on Friday to put to sea for a military 
exercise in the Aegean Sea as tension wound down with Greece over its 
ratification of a treaty giving it the right to double its territorial waters. 
(Military exercises and demonstrations of forces are treated as minus 2. As 
Turkey is the only country, according to this sentence conducting the military 
exercise, it is the sender and Greece is the target). 
February 14, 1996. Turkish Foreign Minister Deniz Baykal, striking a 
conciliatory tone after last month's military standoff with Greece in the Aegean 
Sea, called on Wednesday for direct negotiations to settle territorial disputes 
with Athens. (This is an example of positive rhetoric and Turkey as the party 
sending the message receives a plus 1 score). 
April 22, 1996. A Greek coastguard vessel opened fire on a Turkish fishing 
boat off Turkey's southern coast on Monday, in the latest maritime incident 
between the two feuding NA TO allies. (Using military capabilities against 
another results in a minus 3 ). 
June 19, 1996. Turkey said on Wednesday that improving strained ties with 
neighbor Syria depended on Damascus withdrawing alleged support for 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) rebels fighting a separatist campaign in 
southeast Turkey. (This is an example of negative rhetoric, i.e., minus 1, 
emerging from the Turkish side). 
December 13, 1996. "It's about time that Turkey and Greece, Greece and 
Turkey sit down and talk about their differences and see which we can resolve 
and what we can not," she [Tansu ~iller] said. (The message transmitted is 
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quite cooperative and displays problem-solving. This would be coded as plus 1 
for Turkey). 
October 14, 1997. Turkish fighter planes have begun flying over Cyprus 
armed with live ammunition for the first time in 10 months because of tension 
with neighbor Greece, the Turkish press said on Tuesday. (Demonstration of 
military capabilities receives a minus 2 score). 
October 15, 1997. Turkey's powerful military chief said in comments 
published on Wednesday that concern about a possible clash between Turkish 
and Greek forces over Cyprus was unfounded. (Such a sentence is considered 
as plus 1 because it clar{fies the atmosphere). 
October 1, 1998. President Suleyman Demirel said on Thursday that Turkey 
reserved the right to retaliate against neighbor Syria for its alleged support of 
Turkish Kurd rebels. (This phrase of Turkey threatens Syria and is thus coded 
as minus 1 ). 
E. Coding Process 
The important concept in this study is that the codings are part of the same 
issue. What is coded here is not pure interaction as two subsequent codes might not 
be related. As has been mentioned, just because a sentence referred to Turkish-
Greek or Turkish-Syrian relations did not mean that it was automatically coded. 
Perception also plays its part. If an actor accused the other of hostility, this 
led the accuser to be coded but not the other party. This is because it is illogical to 
code the behavior of a country based solely on the perception of the other. However, 
if the actor accused the other of something more concrete such as border violation 
then the other would be coded accordingly. 
On the matter of Cyprus, one finds four actors or two sides (Turks and 
Greeks). So as to understand the behaviors of all four actors, they were all coded. 
In light of the fair amount of synchronization exhibited between the Turkish parties 
on the one side and the Greek parties on the other side, it makes sense to group the 
findings for the two sides together. If all four actors had not been included then only 
a partial understanding of the issue would have been achieved. An asterisk was 
added to the scores to demonstrate those of Cypriot origin. 
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PKK activities in the Bekaa Valley are also coded. This is because of Syria's 
ius generis rule over the Valley and special role in the administration of Lebanon. 
However, to demonstrate this situation, events which are reported from the Lebanese 
or in Lebanon are coded for Syria but with an asterisk to indicate the difference of 
origins. All terrorist activities reported specifically as being near the Syrian border 
were taken as demonstrating Syrian laxity on this issue and, therefore, Syria was 
coded negatively. 
Once all the relevant data were coded on paper by a human coder, they were 
copied onto the computer. Although other programs could have been used, for the 
purposes of simplicity, Microsoft's Excel was used for storage purposes. 
Measurements were performed on the computer. Measurement is, following Shapiro 
and Markoff also, defined in this research as the "assignment of symbols to objects 
or events according to rules" (1997: 17). This process was carried out with the 
research issues at mind. Measurements included observing the frequency of a code 
for a given year (so as to capture the yearly changes); obtaining the overall average 
for an actor in an issue for the entire time-span (in order to obtain the actor's 
orientation towards the issue); and the yearly average or mean of an actor for a year 
on an issue (so as to visualize the yearly acting behavior). The mean was chosen 
because it is the most common measure of central tendency and is the sum of the 
scores divided by the total number of cases. 
Counting was done with the assumption that higher counts demonstrate 
higher attention, importance or emphasis to the category (Weber, 1985: 56; 
Krippendorff, 1980: 40). The lack of cases in some of the years resulted in this 
study not reporting percentages. The frequency was counted on the basis of a 'Total' 
and an individual actor. 'Total' included all the actions of the actors for a given year 
on an issue and it is assumed that it reflects the overall balance of relations. The 
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individual actor only included the actions of that actor for a given year on an issue. 
However, on the issue of Cyprus, a frequency count was also made for the 'Turks' 
and 'Greeks' which combined the actions of TRNC and Turkey on one side while a 
similar practice was carried out for the Greeks as well. The actions originating from 
Lebanon were few and they were added to Syria's totals. Frequency histograms were 
created for each of the years so as to better see the data as well as to spot any 
potential recording errors. 
Another application of the data was to combine all of the actions together so 
as to find out the average (or mean) of an actor's actions for all of the years under 
study. This was done to capture the general pattern of an actor for the nine year time 
period. The resulting number was compared with those of the other actors to see 
how it stood. The total number of actions and the total scores for each category are 
offered next to this average mean for the actors so as to make it easier to understand 
the nine year period. 
In order to see if a trend over the years emerged, the findings over the years 
had to be compared. Thus, the mean had to be obtained for each year. Here as well a 
mean for all the actors (i.e., 'Total'), for individual actors (i.e., 'Turkey'), and where 
necessary for a combination of two parties (i.e., 'Turks') were found. 
F. Limitations and Delimitations 
Conducting an analysis in this fashion is not without its problems. 11 There is 
a certain amount of doubt associated with the sample. While Reuters was 
deliberately chosen as the sole data in this work, this causes a dilemma. Reuters, as 
mentioned above, is a leader in its own field. However, most events data specialists 
urge using more than one news source so as to increase validity and reliability. In 
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this case, this would have resulted in too much information. Yet, here, the reverse 
has happened with certain years receiving few codings. Although it is unlikely that 
another news agency would have unraveled anything more, this still leaves a certain 
amount of doubt. Clearly, this work suffers from a sample problem. It also 
confirms that using more than one source of data is better (at least in theory) even if 
it increases the chances of repetition with it. For those years where there was too 
little (or no) coding, the work indicates these years. 
Formal studies which pride themselves of their systematic approaches have 
also received criticism. Such approaches have been criticized for not coming up 
with new findings (and even when coming up with new findings, for not better 
connecting them), lacking creativity (in theories and hypotheses) and logical 
consistency, and for laxity in testing (Walt, 1999: 5-48; Dessler, 1991: 340). While 
not oblivious to these claims, it is believed that the general lack of systematic 
approaches to the study of Turkish foreign policy make formal studies necessary if 
for nothing else then for the sake of diversity (Walt, 1999: 48). 
In fact, events data is criticized for the data that it utilizes which is seen as 
being of low quality (noisy) and missing certain types of interactions (Goldstein and 
Freeman, 1990: 39). While these criticisms are more valid for data originating from 
newspapers and periodicals, it also holds true (to a lesser degree) for data provided 
from news wires. Another discussion is whether it is possible to have a scale 
including cooperation and conflict (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990: 39). 12 However, 
these criticisms are not of a crucial nature: All other methods also make use of the 
same type of data and the study of international affairs is full of different 
approaches. Goldstein and Freeman reach the crux of the matter: Analysis is not 
11 A number of articles deal with the criticisms directed at events data projects (for example. 
Davies and McDaniel. 1995: 55-60). 
1: For a study on cooperation-hostility scale. see Goldstein. 1992. 
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hindered by the nature of the data but one should realize that the data on the 
activities of countries do not necessarily reflect the true amount of relationships 
between countries (Goldstein and Freeman, 1990: 41). As long as one is aware of 
this situation and acts accordingly, there should not be major problems. 
Human coding was used in this study. There was not a choice here about 
whether computer coding or human coding should be used. However, it does mean 
that human errors, such as assigning wrong scores and giving wrong information or 
orders to the computer, could have occurred. 13 Even after the numerous checks that 
were carried out, it is still possible that a certain amount of error exists. 
G. Reliability 
The capacity of a measure to bear consistent results is known as reliability. 
The reliability of the method used in this study has been tested in three ways. 
Intercoder reliability is the common procedure in such cases. A graduate 
student coded three randomly chosen years. A session was organized with this 
student where the method was explained and examples were given. The results for 
intercoder reliability can be compared from two angles. In cases where both coders 
coded the same event, there was some amount of similarity (81 % ). However, the 
coder was less prone to find things to code than the author (26 to 48 codings). This 
could be because the process was not clearly explained or because of the result of the 
differences in the characters of the coders. 
The two other reliability test were conducted within the study itself. The first 
one involved known crisis years and the second one dealt with verbal behavior. 
Working from the assumption that a year in which a known crisis occurred between 
actors should produce more codings than other years, it was deduced that crisis years 
13 Savaiano and Schrodt ( 1997) demonstrate the advantages of automated coding. 
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should be captured as eventful years. Although, this might seem obvious, it also 
tests the method used. If the coding process cannot capture the crisis years as being 
eventful years then, obviously, there is something wrong with it. 
It is also assumed that a disproportionate amount of international relations is 
conducted through speeches and verbal communication. Therefore, another 
reliability test conducted within the study involves checking for comments. It seems 
in order to assume that the process has to capture more verbal behavior than other 
sorts of expression. If the coding process cannot capture more verbal behavior than 
other types of behavior, then it seems correct to conclude that the system is 
misconstructed. This means that there has to be more plus and minus ones than the 
rest of the scores. 
The results for these tests were also encouraging. As was expected the crisis 
years witnessed more codings. The findings show that the external crisis years for 
Turkey of 1992 and 1998 (both with Syria over security), 1990 (with Syria over 
water), 1996 (with Greece over Aegean Sea), and 1997 (with the Greeks over 
Cyprus) are captured. This finding and the high number of codings for the rhetoric 
categories (i.e., plus and minus one categories) show that the coding process was 
working reasonably well. The findings show that in all of the issues, more verbal 
behavior was captured than the other types of behavior. 
The results for the reliability tests are encouraging. Therefore, the findings 
for the issues presented in the next chapter can be accepted with some amount of 
confidence. In each of the issues, findings on whether Turkish behavior increased 
over the time period are shared first, followed by the average behavior of the 
countries for the time period and a study of the yearly behavior. A recap of the 
findings and comparisons are offered in the interpretations chapter. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS 
A. Aegean Sea 
In the Aegean Sea issue, it was found that the Turks were more active in the 
latter part of the decade. As can be seen from Figure 1, there were only 4 actions for 
Turkey in 1990 but 18 in 1998. However, the increase in Turkish activity was not 
continuous. While it is not unnatural to find that after a particularly eventful year 
(i.e., Kardak crisis of 1996), a decrease occurred in the next two years, the same 
cannot be said for 1992 and 1993 when there was less action than both 1990 and 
1991. After a decline in detected cases in 1992, it was only in 1995 that there was a 
net increase and Turkish activity picked up after 1995. Therefore, the findings on 
the Aegean issue over increased Turkish activity is satisfied but with qualifications. 
Figure 1: Turkish Actions in the 
Aegean Sea Issue 
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Turkey was the more active party in this dispute. Turkish activities for the 
period under study were 102 while that of Greece were 67 as shown in Table 1. As 
can be seen, the most amount of action for both parties is in the minus one category 
(42 for Turkey; 27 for Greece). As this category captures negative rhetoric, this 
situation is understandable. The Turkish side is more prone to make positive 
rhetoric than the Greeks as seen in the plus one category (25 to 8) but as mentioned 
above Turkey also utilizes much more negative rhetoric. An examination shows that 
the combined rhetoric categories (i.e., minus 1 and plus l) were used more than the 
others and this indicates that the coding method is working reasonably well. 
Table 1: Turkish-Greek Interactions over Aegean Sea: 1990-1998 
Mean No. (+3) (+2) (+1) (-1) (-2) (-3) 
Turkey -0.08 102 3 16 25 42 16 0 
Greece -0.30 67 3 13 8 27 12 4 
Total -0.17 169 6 29 33 69 28 4 
Table 1 also indicates (in the mean column) that Turkey's average behavior 
was more positive than the Greek side for the nine year period. Yet, this should be 
borne in mind along with the fact that the numbers are close and that the attitudes of 
both sides for the time span are in the negative range. Nevertheless, the relatively 
more peaceful Turkish mean and the fact that Greece is seen as perpetuating violence 
(minus 3), seems to indicate that Turkey is the more peaceful of the two. Both 
parties committed almost equal amounts of minus 2. Besides the minus 3s recorded 
solely for Greece, Turkey outperformed Greece in all other scores; the difference 
being the greatest in the minus 1 score, i.e., negative rhetoric. 
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Table 2: Yearly Means and No. of Actions in the Aegean Issue 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total No. 7 11 4 2 9 17 47 42 30 
Total Mean 1.86 -0.55 1 2 -0.33 -0.82 -0.26 0 -0.47 
Turkey's No. 4 7 2 1 7 11 26 28 18 
Turkey's Mean 1.75 -0.57 1 2 -0.29 -0.73 0.19 -0.15 -0.33 
Greece's No. 3 4 2 1 2 6 21 16 12 
Greece's Mean 2 -0.5 1 2 -0.5 -1 -0.81 0.25 -0.67 
A yearly summary of Turkish events (presented in Table 2) shows that 
Turkish activity has been mainly in the negative zone. Two years definitely suffer 
from sample problems: In both 1992 and 1993, the means obtained are too 'positive' 
(respectively 1 and 2) and this is based on the fact that there were too few cases in 
those years. The first year of the sample, 1990, also suffers from the same problem 
though to a lesser extent. Still, it seems that the earlier years of the decade were less 
eventful and more positive. 
In fact, generally, the more eventful years (i.e., the latter years) also resulted 
in negative means for the actors. This was an unexpected finding and indicates that 
the actors felt the necessity to signal their anger, disappointment, or hostility more 
than once. Nonetheless, the most eventful year, 1996, is shown as a positive year for 
Turkey (M=0.19). For Greece, 1996 was the year in which it recorded its most 
amount of behavior and its second most negative mean (M=-0.81). Bearing in mind 
that there were efforts, such as mediations, to defuse the 1996 crisis once it broke 
out, it can be said that Turkey was more positive towards them and that it was more 
satisfied than the Greek side over the Kardak crisis outcome. The year preceding 
that crisis is the year, 1995, in which the most negative means was recorded for both 
parties involved (M=-0. 73 for Turkey and M=-1 for Greece). It was in 1995 that the 
Greek parliament unanimously ratified the Law of the Sea Convention. Schrodt and 
Gerner (1997) had suggested the early warning crisis possibilities of events data. 
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The most amount of events were recorded in a crisis year, 1996, thus increasing the 
reliability of the coding process. 
The relations between Turkey and Greece started to deteriorate in 1994 (total 
M=-0.33). It should be remembered that 1994 was the year when Law of the Sea 
Convention came into force. Greece is a party to this international treaty and 
maintains that it has the right to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles. As such a 
move would turn much of the international waters into Greek waters and, in effect, 
make the Aegean Sea a Greek lake, Turkey expressed its discontent. The navies of 
both countries were put on alert. 
Both countries increased their activities at the same time, as can be seen from 
Table 2. In fact, besides 1996 and 1997, the average behavior of the countries is also 
of the same type, i.e., cooperative or hostile (as demonstrated by the study of the 
yearly means). Therefore, it seems in order to say that there was some amount of 
reciprocity between the countries. 14 A causal examination of the yearly means of the 
actors shows that the countries were moving in accordance with each other and the 
countries considered the other's activities (past and current) while planning and 
reacting. 
To summarize the findings for the Aegean Sea dispute, Turkey was relatively 
more active and positive than Greece. Turkey was more active in 1998 than in 1990 
but the increase was not continuous. Both Turkey and Greece displayed a fair 
amount of reciprocity. 
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B. Cyprus 
In this conflict, Turkey was more active in 1998 than in 1990: While there 
were only 5 cases in 1990, the number was 29 in 1998. However, following 1992, 
there was a decline of cases coded for Turkey and this decline continued up to 1996. 
Thus, four years were below 1990 (and also 1991). While, it is true that after 1996, 
there was a net increase over 1990 and 1991, this does not change that there was a 
decline in recorded events for a long time span. It can be said that since 1995 
Turkish activity has been increasing as demonstrated by Figure 2. 
The greatest amount of events were coded for 1997 followed by 1998. It 
should be borne in mind that 1997 was a crisis year (over S-300 missiles). In fact, if 
the codings for 1997 had not been so numerous then it would have shown that there 
was some problem with the coding process. 
Figure 2: Turkish Actions in the 
Cyprus Issue 
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As can be seen from Table 3, Turkey is the most active actor (95) followed 
respectively by South Cyprus (37), Greece (35) and North Cyprus (29). The lack of 
14 In negotiation, behavior of a reciprocal nature is taken to mean responding by similar types of 
behavior. 
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events coded for Greece is the surprising element here. This could be taken as an 
indication that Greece is more confident than Turkey that their kinsfolk can take care 
of themselves. Demonstratively, the means for the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey are 
both conflictive and close to each other. 
Table 3: Turkish-Greek Interactions over Cyprus: 1990-1998 
Mean No. (+3) (+2) (+1) (-1) (-2) (-3) 
Turkey -0.32 95 1 16 15 46 17 0 
Greece 0.06 35 1 11 3 14 6 0 
North Cyprus -0.24 29 0 8 2 15 2 2 
South Cyprus -0.05 37 0 9 9 11 6 2 
Total -0.19 196 2 44 29 86 31 4 
Greeks 0 72 1 20 12 25 12 2 
Turks -0.3 124 l 24 17 61 19 2 
The average behavior of Athens for the time period demonstrates the most 
amount of cooperative spirit among the four parties. The relative silence of Greece 
probably contributed to this result but it also indicates that decision-makers m 
Athens believe that Greek Cypriots can take care of themselves to a great extent. It 
should also be noted that while the numbers obtained for Greece and Greek Cypriots 
are of different nature, they are not extremely far from each other (respectively, 
M=0.06 and M=-0.05). 
Turkey's mean for the period is the most conflictive (M=-0.31579). It can be 
said that Turkey's pattern of actions on the island have been more hostile than those 
of the others. Interestingly, the most positive side is seen as being Greece followed 
by the Greek Cypriots. TRNC is only second to Turkey on hostility. Therefore, 
when the actions of Turks and Greeks are compared, the Turks are seen as being the 
more negative and more active camp. Turkey's negative approach is probably due to 
two contradictory conditions. Turkey altruistically feels obliged to protect the 
Turkish Cypriots, i.e., Turkey is the anavatan (motherland) while the TRNC is 
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portrayed as the yavruvatan (infant nation). At the same time, from a more selfish 
point of view, so as to feel more secure and less encircled, Turkey needs to ensure 
the presence of a friendly power on the island. 
Therefore, an interesting finding emerges: one of the patrons is cooperative 
while the other is antagonistic. Also, the average behaviors for the nine year period 
between the camps are similar. This demonstrates a certain amount of coordination. 
Table 3 indicates that most of the actions follow under the negative rhetoric 
(86) with Turkey contributing the most to it (46). There are more counts of plus 2 
than plus 1 which is also an attestation to the amount of peacemaking attempts on the 
island. However, the rhetoric categories combined are dominant in this issue as well 
and indicate that the coding process works reasonably well. This was also the issue 
where the greatest number of codings occurred (196 ). 
Table 4: Yearly Means and No. of Actions in the Cyprus Issue 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total No. 10 10 12 6 2 5 32 60 52 
Total Mean 0.9 0.5 1.5 0.67 2 -1 -0.75 -0.65 -0.15 
Turkey's No. 5 8 3 3 1 2 11 30 29 
Turkey's Mean 1.2 0.5 1 0.67 2 -1 -0.27 -0.85 -0.48 
Greece's No. 4 1 2 2 1 1 3 10 11 
Greece's Mean 1 2 2 1.5 2 -1 -1.67 -0.5 -0.18 
North Cyprus's No. 1 1 3 1 0 0 8 5 10 
North Cyprus's Mean -1 -1 2 -1 0 0 -0.35 -0.6 0.3 
South Cyprus's No. 0 0 4 0 0 2 10 12 9 
South Cyprus's Mean 0 0 1.25 0 0 -1 -0.4 -0.25 0.44 
Turks' No. 6 9 6 4 l 2 19 38 39 
Turks' Mean 0.83 0.33 1.5 0.25 2 -1 -0.68 -0.82 -0.28 
Greeks' No. 4 1 6 2 1 3 13 22 20 
Greeks' Mean 1 2 1.5 1.5 2 -1 -0.85 -0.36 0.1 
As has been mentioned previously, many of the years suffered from sample 
difficulties and this is reflected in the numbers obtained for some of the years: 1993-
1995. The years where Turkey was more active coincided with those that it was 
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more aggressive as seen above in Table 4. After 1995 (which suffers from too few 
codings and is thus suspect), the most negative year for Turkey is seen as being 
1997. That was the year when the greatest amount of debate over the introduction of 
S-300 missiles to Cyprus took place. The year prior, 1996, shows that Turkey had a 
negative mean but that the Greeks already were seeing red is shown through the fact 
that Greece's most negative mean (M=-1.67) was witnessed. Yet, in 1997, 
following their attempted fait accompli, the Greek side was more positive and this is 
also witnessed in 1998. This could partly be due to the increased international 
outcry against the Greek decision to bring in the missiles and Greek attempts to 
better project themselves in the international arena. Instead, it was the Turkish side 
which became increasingly more negative. 
A yearly comparison of the Turkish and Greek camps confirms that the latter 
was more positive except for one year. Only in 1996 was the Turkish behavior more 
cooperative than the Greeks (even though the mean of both sides were actually in 
negative digits). Besides one year, namely 1995, the Turkish camp was more active. 
An examination of the means of Greece and Turkey reveals that a certain amount of 
reciprocity occurred, as both countries exhibited conflictive and cooperative 
behaviors in the same years. This feature is also viewed when the findings of the 
sides are grouped under Greeks and Turks: Besides 1998, which was a year when 
the behavior of the Turks was negative while that of the Greeks was positive, the 
sides also acted cooperatively or not at the same time. Approaching the issue of 
reciprocity from the point of Cypriot communities one finds out that when both sides 
acted, they acted similarly. Otherwise their behaviors did not follow a pattern. Both 
of the Cypriots became more active in the post-1995 era. Therefore, an amount of 
reciprocity is exhibited. 
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A causal picture of coordination within the camps can be obtained through a 
study of the yearly averages obtained. In cases where both mainlander and islander 
Greeks acted, their actions were by and large of the same type (positive or negative) 
except in 1998 when the Greek Cypriots (M=0.44) were depicted as being 
cooperative while Athens was not (M=-0.18). The findings for the Turkish camp are 
more controversial. While in the years before 1995, Turkey was more cooperative 
than TRNC, this situation changed in 1995. Turkish behavior was recorded as being 
hostile from 1995 onwards. The TRNC's behavior did not greatly alter until 1998 
when its behavior became more peaceful. These series of findings seem to show that 
Turkey's average policy approached that of the islanders and that the TRNC is not 
the puppet of Ankara. 
To sum up, Turkey was the most active actor as well as being the actor whose 
actions were in general more of a negative nature. This behavior resulted in more 
conflictive behavior emerging from the Turkish grouping than from the Greeks. The 
sides demonstrated reciprocity in their behavior to a great extent. 
C. Holbrooke's mediation in 1996 
An examination of Holbrooke's prophecy that 1996 would be the year of 
Cyprus results in a mixed picture. As the mean for the total of all interactions, 
shown above in Table 4, in 1995 (M=-1) was relatively less hostile in 1996 (M=-
0.75), a somewhat favorable picture emerges. On top of this, Turkey's behavior 
certainly became more positive (M=-0.27273 in 1996 compared with M=- l in 1995). 
Yet, this can certain I y not be taken as the great historic breakthrough that he was 
conjuring up in 1995. The positive effects, if any, of this mediation effort were 
short-lived as Turkey's average behavior tilted towards more hostility in 1997 (M=-
0.85). Also, it should not be forgotten that 1995 is one of the years that seems to 
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suffer from a sample error caused by the fact that there was not a great amount of 
coded cases. Thus, a comparison with 1995 does not seem to be the right answer. 
Comparing the mean for 1996 with that of the total time span ( 1990-1998 including 
1996) would show that this was a much more negative year than average. All in all, 
it is hard to see a great breakthrough. 
Figure 3 depicts what the average behavior of the Turkish and Greek sides 
were in the period under study. As can be seen, while Holbrooke's input might have 
improved relations in 1996 when compared to 1995, the change is not great and 
Turkish conduct actually became more hostile in 1997. An amelioration took place 
in 1998 but basing that solely on Holbrooke's effort would be an injustice to other 
events, including NATO mediation in 1997 and the S-300 crisis. 
Figure 3: The Effects of Holbrooke's 
Cyprus Mediation 
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To be fair to Holbrooke, 1996 witnessed a worsening of Greek-Turkish 
relations as a result of the Kardak crisis in the Aegean Sea and he spent at least some 
of the time mediating not the Cyprus problem but the islet crisis. Following the 
Kardak crisis, he cooled down his rhetoric but the damage was done. 
Also, Holbrooke did not make the Cypriots feel any more secure as seen by 
the fact that the end of 1996 and the beginning of 1997 saw the announcement of a 
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deal between the Greek Cypriot government and Russia over S-300 missiles. As a 
result, the Turkish sides became more hostile whereas the others became more 
cooperative following their attempts to increase their security through the 
procurement of arms. The last year of the study, 1998, saw also a general 
improvement in interactions between the sides: Turkey was more positive than in 
1997 but less than in 1996. However, to place this improvement solely on 
Holbrooke's shoulders is wrong. If nothing else, there was also a NA TO 
involvement starting in July 1997. This NA TO involvement also seems to confirm 
the fact that international expectations of a Holbrooke success in Cyprus had 
diminished enough to start a second front. 
D. Security 
Within the context of Turkish-Syrian relations, 1998 was much more eventful 
than 1990 in the issue of security, as shown in Figure 4. This would seem to support 
the view that Turkey has become more active in the years following the end of the 
Cold War. Up to 1992, a crisis year, there was an increase in reported activity but 
the next three years show a decrease in events. 
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The fact that those years did not even surpass 1991 in number of activity 
reveals that the view of a continuous increase in Turkish activity since the end of the 
Cold War is unfounded. As both 1992 and 1998 were crisis years in Turkish-Syrian 
relations, the high number of actions recorded for those years does not show that 
Turkey became increasingly more active. Nonetheless, in the period following 1995 
Turkey became more active in this issue. While 1996 shows an increase in the 
amount of actions, 1997 was a silent year from the point of Turkey. Yet, this was 
the silence before the storm as 1998 was the year when Turkey was the most active 
and assertive in the period under study. 
Table 5: Turkish-Syrian Interactions over Security: 1990-1998 
Mean No. (+3) (+2) (+1) (-1) (-2) (-3) 
Turkey 0.37 60 3 15 14 25 3 0 
Syria 0.50 60 3 21 12 15 9 0 
Total 0.43 120 6 36 26 40 12 0 
A study of the entire time period shows that the sides in general approached 
each quite cooperatively as can be seen from Table 5. Somewhat interestingly, Syria 
was as active as Turkey on a matter of great internal importance to Turkey, e.g., 
combating terrorism. As pointed out above, most researches believe that Syria is 
using terrorism for its own ends. Syria appears cooperative in normal diplomatic 
interactions so as to ward off Turkish and (to a lesser degree) international 
criticisms. However, the high number of minus 2s for Syria captures their negative 
behavior (without actually causing direct violence by themselves). In order to offset 
the high number of minus 2s, Syria also has a high number of plus 2s. In fact, it is 
only in the rhetoric categories that Turkey outplays Syria. This difference in 
selections of moves by the two sides shows also the differences in the two countries: 
Turkey's behavior is in tune with a majority of countries which believe that 
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discussions can solve matters while Syria, which is seen as a rogue or even terrorist-
sponsoring state by some, is more prone to act, instead of discussing. 
The positive means for the time period is surprising. These numbers show 
that while thousands of people died in Turkey by Syrian-supported insurgency, the 
relations between the two countries were not allowed to worsen. 
Table 6: Yearly Means and No. of Actions in the Security Issue 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total No. 3 8 18 2 6 7 19 2 55 
Total Mean 1.00 0.63 1.50 3.00 1.67 -1.29 -0.63 0.00 0.40 
Turkey's No. 2 4 7 1 4 3 10 0 29 
Turkey's Mean 0.50 1.25 1.43 3.00 1.75 -0.33 -0.70 0.00 0.14 
Syria's No. 1 4 11 1 2 4 9 2 26 
Syria's Mean 2.00 0.00 1.55 3.00 1.50 -2.00 -0.56 0.00 0.69 
As seen in Table 6, a certain degree of reciprocity is witnessed in the 
activities of the countries as demonstrated by the fact that the parties to the dispute 
acted antagonistically or not at the same time. In the early part of the decade, the 
sides undertook fewer actions but were more prone to acting in a cooperative 
manner. However, it should be remembered that many of the years in this issue 
suffer from too few cases. Both countries displayed the maximum amount of 
cooperative spirit in 1993 (following the 1992 crisis over Syrian support to PKK): 
in 1993, the two neighbors signed a security protocol in which the PKK was labeled 
a terrorist organization and the Syrian state minister for security, Nasir Kaddur, 
announced on Syrian television that President Hafiz al-Asad had banned the PKK 
(Olson, 1996: 86). This explains why the relations between the countries were 
perceived as being good. However, this honeymoon was short-lived as they both 
scored negative averages in 1995 and 1996. Following the 1998 crisis, the parties 
espoused more cooperative moves towards each other for the first time in a long 
time. The Syrians recorded their worst behavior in 1995: Syrian support to PKK 
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operations in Hatay had increased to the chagrin of Turkey (as shown in Olson. 
1996: 86-92). These findings (for 1993 and 1995) show that just because a year has 
fe\\' codings does not mean it should be ignored, especially if they can receive 
support from other sources. 
The silence in 1997 was actually misleading and when Turkey's ensuing 
actions took place, it proved that Turkey \\as not happy with the Syrians in the 
recent past. The year when Turkey was the most hostile was reported as being 1996 
and not 1998. The main reasons are that once the confrontation started in the 
October of 1998, mediation (mainly from Egypt and Iran) and Syrian back dmvn 
resulted in an impro\·ement in the relations. The highest recordings \1./ere for 1998 
and this shows that the coding process was working well enough to grasp this 
situation. Failure to capture this crisis year \\"Ot!ld have resulted in doubts about its 
reliabilitv. 
Here as well. the years with less reported actions were those during \Vhich 
better relations took place. While both countries were equally active in this issue, 
Syria was more positive than Turkey. Turkey was more active at the end of the nine 
year period than at the beginning. A certain amount of reciprocity took place as 
demonstrated through the similar acting beha\·iors during corresponding periods. 
E. Effects of Turkish-Israeli Cooperation on Turkish-Syrian Relations 
Turkish-Israeli relations obviously did not reach their high point in one day. 
The relations have been building throughout the 1990s. Hmvevcr, it seems correct to 
say that the military agreements of 1996 demonstrated that a nev .. · zenith in the 
cooperation between the sides had been reached. 1' While both parties have on many 
There \\'ere three m<1jor agreements signed bct\\een l<.rael and TurJ.:ey in !99Ci. The most 
contrmersial was a military training and cooperation agreement (from which the sides derive the 
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occasions maintained that it is not directed against any other country and that Turkey 
has similar agreements with other countries, Syria (and the Islamic world in general) 
disapproves of the relations. 
Inspecting the year pnor to the agreements demonstrates that, in 1995, 
Turkey and Syria were acting in a highly conflictive manner against each other. 
Syria recorded its most conflictive behavior in that year and while it was relatively 
more positive in 1996, the damage was done. Conflictive behavior emerging from 
the Syrians in 1995 (M=-2) towards Turkey contributed to the military agreements of 
1996. As has been mentioned above, 1996 is the year when the mean for Turkey 
(M=-0.70) was the most hostile for the time period under study. Discussions over 
the Golan Heights were also taking place between Israel and Syria in 1996 and it 
seemed possible that the relations between the two countries might improve. It has 
been mentioned elsewhere that Turkish decision-makers expected Syria to turn its 
attention towards Turkey (and the Hatay province in particular) once the Golan 
Heights problem was solved. Thus, it is relatively easy to speculate that Turkey, so 
as to hinder progress, could have chosen to increase its relations with Israel thus 
reducing the Israeli incentive to make concessions (solely to overcome its feeling of 
encirclement): an Israel on amicable terms with Turkey would be an even more 
potent force. However, this would be ignoring the fact that Israel had started to push 
for increased cooperation with Turkey from 1994 onwards: the relations between 
Turkey and Syria became increasingly worse from that period onwards. This 
situation is also demonstrated by Figure 5. Following a year which can be described 
as one of 'unnatural silence,' Turkey in 1998 showed its disapproval of Syrian 
conduct. 
right to use each other's air space for training). The other agreements were on defense industrial 
cooperation and on free-trade. 
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Figure 5: Security Interactions between 
1994 and 1998 
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While, it might be wrong to say that Turkish-Syrian relations have been 
negatively affected only by the Israeli factor (as the Syrians maintain), the results 
obtained through content analysis indicate that Turkey became more assertive against 
Syria following increased cooperation with Israel. Israeli overtures followed by 
Syrian hostility in 1995 resulted in the 1996 agreements which led to the Turkish-
Syrian confrontation in 1998. The Syrian comportment in 1995 played an important 
role (but not the only one) in Turkey's decision to augment relations with Israel 
which resulted in the aggravation of Turkish-Syrian relations. 
F. Water 
As can be seen in Figure 6, Turkey was much more active in the beginning of 
the time period than at the end. It is hard to even say that Turkey became more 
active after 1995 because only in 1996 did Turkey commit a fair amount of actions. 
Turkey is depicted as becoming less active during the 1990s on this issue. 
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Figure 6: Turkish Actions in the 
Water Issue 
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Therefore, the estimation that Turkey has become increasingly active in the 
1990s is refuted here. The reasons for this are probably numerous. For one thing, it 
seems in order to say that the beginning of the decade witnessed more important 
developments on the water issue. For example, the filling of the Atattirk Dam's 
Reservoir in 1990 caused resentment from the downstream riparians. Iraq was also 
ostracized by its invasion of Kuwait in the international community. Therefore, 
Turkey for much of the period did not have to worry about an Iraqi-Syrian alliance 
causing problems. At the individual level, the death of President Ozal, in 1993 has 
meant that some of the initiatives that he had personally backed during his lifetime, 
such as the peace pipeline project, if not discarded, were no longer as enthusiastically 
supported as they once were. The increasing realization that Syria had no chance 
whatsoever versus the Turkish side militarily also contributed to Turkish abstinence. 
This was also the issue where the least amount of events were coded. The 
relative silence on the part of Turkey is understandable as it is in a far more 
advantageous position than Syria. Syrian inaction is more interesting (which with 18 
actions is less than Turkey's 28 actions). Syria has more than on one occasion said 
that the Euphrates is vital for its survival as shown by the fact that they have a 
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Minister for the Euphrates Dam (Schulz, 1995: 93). This position might be partially 
illuminated when one remembers the issue linkage between water and terrorism: In 
the issue of security discussed previously, there were as many actions recorded for 
Syria as there were for Turkey. Therefore, Syria, believing that it cannot obtain any 
concessions from Turkey by dealing with the water issue alone, is conducting a two-
headed policy of water and security negotiations. 
This issue also confirms Turkey's position as a regional power because its 
silence pushed the Syrians to silence as well. In three different years, there were no 
reported activities for the Turkish side. Somewhat interestingly, the two years where 
high amounts of activity were reported for Turkey in this issue (i.e., 1992 and 1998) 
coincide with crisis years between Turkey and Syria over security concerns. The 
amount of activity reported for Turkey in 1992 was not reached, let alone surpassed, 
up to 1998. 
Table 7: Turkish-Syrian Interactions over Water: 1990-1998 
Mean No. (+3) (+2) (+1) (-1) (-2) (-3) 
Turkey 0.32 28 0 8 7 12 1 0 
Syria 0.83 18 0 7 6 5 0 0 
Total 0.52 46 0 15 13 17 1 0 
As can be seen from Table 7, the total interactions between the sides is 
relatively positive. The Syrian side's approach is much more positive than the 
Turkish side. As has been mentioned elsewhere, the two sides are not likely to fight 
over water and the positive outlook for the time period under study can be taken as 
its vindication. 
The presence of plus 2s show that the sides tried to solve their grievances but 
to no avail. In this issue as well, the rhetoric categories were detected more than the 
others. Turkey scored more highly than Syria on all categories. As this is also true 
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for the minus 1 and minus 2 categories, Turkey's relatively more negative side than 
Syria is understandable. Turkey's relatively less cooperative orientation is not 
bizarre when one remembers that Turkey perceives few incentives to be cooperative. 
Table 8: Yearly Means and No. of Actions in the Water Issue 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Total No. 13 5 13 0 0 2 10 0 3 
Total Mean 0.31 1.6 1.15 0 0 1.5 -0.6 0 0 
Turkey No. 9 3 5 0 0 2 7 0 2 
Turkey's Mean 0.22 1.67 1.2 0 0 1.5 -0.7 0 -1 
Syrian No. 4 2 8 0 0 0 3 0 1 
Syria's Mean 0.5 1.5 1.13 0 0 0 -0.3 0 2 
A yearly comparison of the patterns has to be approached carefully for this 
issue because of the relatively few number of events coded. The year when Turkey 
was the most negative was 1998 (with M=-1) followed by 1996 (with M=-0.71429). 
It should be noted that 1996 was the worst for the security issue. Most of the other 
years were positive in outlook. The years in which the parties were more hostile or 
more positive usually coincided with each other. Here as well, the parties, especially 
Turkey, became more hostile as the years progressed. Some amount of reciprocity 
seems to have taken place in this issue. 
Turkey was the more active and less cooperative of the sides. However, 
Turkey acted more in the beginning of the decade than at the end and, thus, increased 
Turkish activity is not witnessed in this issue. From the point of negotiating styles, 
reciprocity seems to have occurred in this issue as well. 
The following chapter offers a summary and comparison of the findings as 
well as the implications of these findings. 
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CHAPTER V 
INTERPRETATIONS 
A. Summary and Comparison of Findings 
The findings indicate that Turkey's foreign policy demonstrated an increased 
amount of activity and assertiveness during the course of the 1990s. Turkey was 
also more active and aggressive when compared with Greece and Syria. In the 
issues of Aegean Sea and Cyprus with the Greeks and security with the Syrians, the 
view that Turkey has become more active during the 1990s is supported. The only 
issue that comes against the general trend is the water issue. · Even within the cases 
where the premise of increased Turkish activity is supported, this dynamism receives 
only a qualified approval because the increase is not continuous and fluctuates 
greatly. In three out of four issues, Turkey is also the relatively more conflictive 
side. In only the Aegean Sea dispute with Greece is it somewhat more positive. 
However, while other actors might cause direct violence, Turkey refrains from such 
behavior (as witnessed by the lack of any minus 3 scores for Turkey in any of the 
four issues under study). In all issues, Turkey recorded its most negative means in 
1995 or afterwards. 
Compared to the other actors, Turkey is also the more active side in three out 
of four issues under discussion. Only in the security issue is the other actor, Syria, as 
active as Turkey. A comparison of the cases would confirm that Turkey was more 
active in both issues with Greece than with the issues involving Syria. The ordering 
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of importance for Turkey solely based on the number of actions committed for 
Turkey would be: Aegean Sea, Cyprus, security and water. 
A great deal of reciprocity also occurs between the actors in the issues under-
study. Reciprocal behavior includes responding to both hostile and cooperative 
actions in a similar fashion. The yearly types of and amounts of behaviors for the 
various actors shows that the sides acted similarly for most of the time. Causally 
comparing the findings for the two issues between Turkey and Greece shows that 
Turkey acted similarly in both issues for the period between 1990 and 1998. A 
yearly comparison of Turkish conduct in the issues of Cyprus and Aegean Sea would 
show that, besides 1993 and 1994, Turkish activity increased and decreased at the 
same time. However, a causal observation of the averages for the two issues 
obtained would lead one to maintain that changes in behavior did not take place at 
the same time. The comparison of the findings for the issues between Syria and 
Turkey indicates that Turkish behavior in both issues shows similar conduct. Yet, 
analyzing whether Turkey is cooperative or hostile at the same time in both issues 
does not lead to conclusive data as the amount of cases in the water issue is too few. 
External events have mixed effects on foreign policy patterns. Regional 
alignment clearly influenced the relations. Turkish-Syrian relations were at least 
partially influenced by improved Turkish-Israeli relations. Ankara certainly became 
more assertive against Syria as it increased its cooperation with Tel Aviv in the 
aftermath of the 1996 agreements. Mediation efforts had less effect. Holbrooke's 
mediation of the Cyprus conflict never realized the success that either he, the actors 
involved, or the international community envisaged. Subsequent events illustrated 
this fact: Holbrooke cooled down his rhetoric, there was not a feeling of enhanced 
security among the actors involved in the conflict (e.g., Greek Cypriot attempts to 
place more arms on the island), and the international community started to look 
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elsewhere for breakthroughs, e.g., NATO involvement in July l 997 seems to have 
been more fruitful. 
From the point of methodology, approaching Turkey's foreign policy through 
the study of content analysis, and events data in particular, offers a systematic 
perspective. A thorough examination of Turkish foreign policy must be conducted 
through this method. It has its limits but increased use will result in the 
improvement of the analytical tool. A coding range from plus 3 to minus 3 is useful 
for its simplicity. Although its few categories and disregard of details leave it open 
to criticism, that is also the reason why it is such a powerful tool for analysis. 
An unexpected result of this study was witnessing early warning crisis 
capabilities. In those years where there are enough codings, the average negative 
behavior by one or more actors can be used to identify the possibility of crises in the 
near future. For example, the Kardak Crisis in 1996 was preceded by a negative 
mean (in the range of M=-0. 7) in 1995 on the part of Turkey and a similar Turkish 
mean in 1996 with Syria on the issue of security was a forewarning of events to 
occur in the first next year of coding, 1998. The early warning capabilities of 
quantitative sciences had been mentioned by Schrodt and Gerner (1997) and this 
work also exhibits this feat. Early warning is not limited to Turkey in this study. A 
careful examination of the Greek camp in 1996 shows that the 1997 crisis over the 
Greek Cypriot desire to acquire S-300 missiles could have been foreseen. 
Relying on one news source, while practical, brings its own problems as 
mentioned in the chapter on methodology. Using more than one source could have 
decreased the sample problems, such as too few codings, as well increasing 
reliability and validity. However, the fact that findings from some years where there 
were few codings have been substantiated by other sources, i.e., journal articles, is 
reassuring, e.g., the findings for 1995 in the security issue. 
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B. Implications 
Turkish foreign policy has become much more active over the 1990s. This is 
confirmed not only by Turkish actions in the issues under examination but also by 
other factors such as increased Turkish involvement in international organizations 
and by the role played by Turkey in the creation of international organizations. 
Participation in peacekeeping activities is a sound indicator of increased Turkish 
military cooperation at the international level. Another important factor is that in out 
of the four issues, Turkey is the most active actor in three and as active in the fourth. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that Turkey is publicly more active than both Greece 
and Syria which are perceived by Turkey as being the main centers of threat. 
Findings from this study confirm Turkey's position as a regional power. Its 
relative silence in the water issue shows that Turkey is regionally capable enough to 
thwart any unfavorable attempts to change the status quo (a situation also confirmed 
by Greek restraint in increasing its territorial waters to 12 miles). More crucially, it 
shows that if Turkey does not cooperate on an issue, the other sides have little 
possibility of achieving a favorable outcome by themselves. This realization 
probably causes these countries to become hostile towards Turkey, as shown by 
Greek and Syrian support to terrorist organizations and individuals such as Abdullah 
Ocalan. Also, Turkish capability extends enough in the vicinity of its region to stop 
others from taking certain actions, e.g., the Greek Cypriot back down over S-300 
missiles. This is not to say that increased Turkish behavior displays increased 
sagacity, e.g., the S-300 missiles are now to be placed on Crete, arguably in a more 
strategic position. 
The relatively more positive Turkish approach to the Aegean Sea highlights 
the fact that Greeks see the Turkish position as one of aggrandizement at their 
expense as well as an attack on their need of security. As the Greeks do not believe 
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that they have anything to gain from bilateral negotiations and everything to lose, it 
is understandable why Greeks abstain from such meetings and maintain their 
intransigent positions. The somewhat more positive Turkish stance on this issue 
shows that the Turkish side wants to solve this problem cooperatively, if only 
slightly more. Bearing in mind that Turkey's approach (i.e., mean) is also negative 
and close to Greece's, Turkey is cautious about opening a Pandora's box. The fact 
that both numbers are quite close and in the negative range reveals that there is a 
certain amount of reciprocity in the relationship. Turkish proposals to discuss all 
matters of contention with Greece are rejected. Turkey can overcome this 
intransigence through the international community, e.g., in the Aegean Sea, the 
International Court of Justice's rulings on the continental shelf compelled the Greeks 
to accept it as a matter of discussion. 
Any proposed solution to Cyprus has to take the behaviors of the patrons, i.e., 
mainlanders, into account. The findings show that Turkey is more hostile than all 
other parties and Greece is the most peaceful. As Turkish Cypriots are more 
dependent than the Greek Cypriots on their mainlander patrons, it seems in order to 
maintain that any solution to the island has to be primarily agreeable to the Cypriots 
and to Turkey. This is not to downplay the relationships between the Greek Cypriots 
and Greece. The decision to base the S-300 missiles on Crete shows that when duty 
calls, Athens also feels compelled to come to the assistance of the islanders. The 
difference in the approaches of the patrons is that Turkey believes that it has to be 
involved to a greater extent in Cyprus. Prodromou (1998) correctly points out the 
importance of Turkey but she does this at the expense of making other actors seem 
superfluous, i.e., the findings show that the Cypriots do not merely follow their 
patron thus revealing their importance for any possible solution. 
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In both issues with Syria, the countries are seen as maintaining cordial 
relations (with Syria as the more positive side). This is despite the importance of the 
issues for the two countries. Syria has indicated the salience of the water issue many 
times and Turkey's struggle for internal security is evident. The deterioration in the 
relations between Turkey and Syria following the increasing amount of cooperation 
between Turkey and Israel shows that an actor (in this case, Turkey) will try to alter 
the course of events when it believes that its position might be affected by an 
improvement between two other actors (one of which is seen as being deeply hostile, 
e.g., Syria). It is notable that Turkey and Israel increased their relations in 1996. 
That was also the year when improvements were attempted between Syria and Israel 
in their relations. Taking into account that Turkey was worried about the possible 
repercussions of such a move (Kohen, 1996), it does not take much imagination to 
suggest that Turkey pushed for greater ties so as to influence ensuing events. 
Implying that Turkey and Israel only improved their relations so as encircle the 
Syrians would be exaggerating because the countries also have other reasons to 
increase their relations. These can be counted as relatively similar regimes, similar 
positions in the region, favorable historical relationship, increasing economic ties, 
and the endorsement of the United States. 
It is not reasonable to believe that Turkey and Israel would ally themselves 
against Syria as the latter is inferior in capabilities (economically and militarily) to 
both of them. Syria cannot go beyond supporting internal disaffection within Turkey 
and occasionally obtaining condemnations of Turkey in the international arena (i.e., 
mostly from the Arab organizations). Nonetheless, in order to deter Damascus from 
attempting the unexpected, Turks and Israelis saw numerous benefits in increased 
cooperation. More importantly, Syria is one actor that threatens them both. Thus, 
the findings indicate more a case of balancing against threat instead of balancing 
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against power. 16 The existence of this Syrian problem cajoled them into increased 
relations which resulted in worsening of relations between Turkey and Syria. 
Following 6calan's departure from Damascus in 1998, relations between 
Syria and Turkey improved. The findings show that in the aftermath of the 1992 
crisis, the relations also improved but not for long as Syria gradually increased its 
support to terrorists which resulted in Turkish patience declining until the crisis in 
October 1998 occurred. Syria's demands over water have not been met by the 
Turkish side. Water is shown as the key reason why Syria supports the Kurds 
(Kinzer, 1999b: 5). This linkage between water and security exists because of the 
importance of water to Syria and the high costs that Turkey suffers from Syrian 
support to terrorism. 
Turkey delayed discussions on various issues with Syria until the security 
issue was solved. This was clearly shown by Turkish moves in the Damascus 
summit of August 1994. Furthermore, in 1995, Turkish decision-makers identified 
Syrian assistance to the PKK as the primary criterion (Gresh, 1998: 193) on which 
the relations between the countries would rest. Also, Syria confronts its more 
powerful rivals by carrying out unconventional tactics (see Harik, 1997). Territorial 
disenchantment and the history between the sides further disrupts the relations. 
However, Syria extradited 6calan in 1998 and Turkish security officials are 
on record as having said that Syria is complying with the Adana agreement of 
October 1998 (which apparently brought an end to Syria's support for PKK 
terrorism) ("Ankara," 1999: A3). Furthermore, Turkey is not against using water as 
a means to improve its regional security as long as it is on its own terms. 17 Much can 
16 Walt ( 1987) differentiates the two by saying that in balance of threat theory, the threat factor 
will be the determining element whereas in the more traditional balance of power theory, states will 
balance against power imbalances. 
17 Studies on means of transporting water to Israel from Turkey have been carried out and 
discussions were conducted on whether water transferred to Northern Cyprus from Turkey could be 
sold to the Greek Cypriots (Kinzer, l 999b: 5). 
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be said for negotiating from a position of strength (and goodwill) and Turkey seems 
well-advised to seize the day. 18 After all, success that is obtained through coercion is 
temporary (Patchen, 1988: 330). Current Turkish attempts to improve economic ties 
might achieve a soothing effect only if the benefits that Syria receives economically 
outweigh its need for more water. It is unlikely that increased economic ties can 
lead to much improvement in the relations as Syria's economy is in bad shape and 
Syria is reportedly experiencing its worst drought in decades. 19 
The failure of Holbrooke's mediation reinforces the view that mediators are 
by themselves not enough and that hurting stalemates are a necessity for the success 
of a mediation effort (see also Mooradian and Druckman, forthcoming). None of the 
sides for the years between 1990 and 1998 were suffering enough from the situation 
on Cyprus to make serious concessions. The patrons, i.e., the mainland countries, 
cannot appear to abandon the islanders, mostly because of domestic repercussions 
(and in the case of Turkey, security concerns), and thus it is improbable that they 
will coerce their sides to make serious concessions. For much of the nine year 
period, their hands were effectively 'tied.' This means that the island communities 
will be the main reason for any kind of change in the relationships. Neither of the 
two deplored the current situa!ion on the island enough to attempt to break the ice. 
Occasional proposals do not go far enough to meet the needs and demands of the 
sides. Nor does it seem as if all of these ideas are seriously supported by their 
sponsors. For example, President Denkta~ proposed the idea of a confederation in 
mid-1998 but by early 1999, his support seemed to have faded away ("Denkta~," 
18 Damascus's attempts to improve its military position through the acquirement of long-range 
missiles and receiving information on the production of advanced chemical weapons from Russians 
can have repercussions for Ankara. See Marcus. 1999; and Evans. 1999. 
19 Syria's economy has been distraught by low oil prices and lack of rain ("Syria." 1999: 44). 
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1999: A3). A serious deterioration in the conditions of the actors can constitute the 
hurting stalemate. 
Among the countries in this study, Turkey is stronger on many areas, e.g., 
GDP, armed forces, and population, than the others. Morgan and Palmer's assertion 
that stronger countries will by and large initiate more disputes seems to apply for 
Turkey as well ( 1997: 241 ). Turkey was involved in numerous crises in the 1990s 
and, although it was not solely responsible for them, it was not backing away from 
them. Turkey also started to dispute Greece's blanket claim on the islets of the 
Aegean Sea more forcibly than ever before. Although, there have been ample 
occasions in the 1990s for a militarized conflicts to occur between Turkey and its 
neighbors, this has not happened. Hensel and Diehl show that a number of reasons 
could be behind this situation (1994: 479-506). 
The primary reason that Hensel and Diehl (1994) offer is that an issue might 
not be salient enough. Yet, this does not seem to be the case in the issues under-
examination, especially with Greece. A case can be made that President Asad of 
Syria did not believe enough in the 'Kurdish cause' to go to war with Ankara over 
Ocalan. Another offered reason is that if the initiator did not actually use military 
force then the target will also not respond by using military means. In the case of the 
issues under study here, Turkey's hostile actions never went beyond threats and 
demonstration of capabilities. Since Turkey is accepted as having commenced the 
confrontations in the 1990s, and it did not resort to actual use of force, this would 
help explain why Syria and Greece also refrained from using military capabilities 
during the crises. The fact that Turkey did not commit direct violence (i.e., lack of 
minus 3 score for Turkey) against its rivals seems to be the reason why all of the 
crises were defused. Another contributory factor is that both of its rivals are 
74 
relatively weaker in capabilities. As Turkey and Syria have avoided militarized 
options in the past, this 'historic factor' also plays a role. 
The effects of domestic politics on Turkish foreign policy are quite visible. It 
seems that internal reasons and not international reasons played the determining role 
in the dynamism exhibited in Turkish foreign policy. A greater amount of activity 
was witnessed following 1995 elections (1995-1998) than in the immediate period 
following of the Cold War (1990-1994). Turkey's foreign policy also turned towards 
greater assertiveness in the same period. International relations literature generally 
tends to expect that systemic-level factors should have precedence in such cases (see 
Grieco, 1990: 24). Yet the reverse is witnessed here. 
The scapegoat theory applies to Turkey's actions following the post-1995 
election era which the findings (from the Aegean Sea, Cyprus and security issues) 
depict as being the period in which Turkish dynamism took flight. The findings for 
1996, 1997, and 1998 confirm that actors are more likely to become entangled in 
external problems when there is an internal problem. 20 While Turkey was not solely 
responsible for the crises with Greece and Syria (among others), it was no longer 
turning a blind eye to the adverse actions of others. Turkish foreign policy was 
adversely affected by the succession of weak coalition governments and regime 
discussions. 'Peace at Home and Peace in the World' became 'Crisis at Home and 
Crisis in the World.' Although such an adage seems to be an exaggeration, it is 
evident that Turkey experienced crises both externally and internally from 1995 
onwards and the findings show that Turkish foreign policy generally became more 
antagonistic and active. Furthermore, the relative openness of Turkish society means 
20 It should be remembered that following the 1995 general elections in Turkey, there were many 
internal problems. Each year of the post-1995 era witnessed an external crisis with one of the 
numerous neighbors of Turkey: In 1996, there was the Kardak crisis. The next year witnessed the 
S-300s crisis in Cyprus. In 1998, there was the confrontation over Syrian support to terrorism. 
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that certain societal characteristics could have had some amount of influence on 
Turkish foreign policy. The findings show that a move towards nationalism and 
chauvinism in Turkish domestic politics (mid-1990s onwards) coincides with a 
period of increasing assertiveness in Turkish foreign policy. 
The findings suggest that two individuals, one in the beginning and one at the 
end, pushed for increased activity externally for Turkey. The early 1990s saw the 
Ozal period in Turkey. President Ozal had grandiose projects for Turkey as 
witnessed by his flirtation with the idea of occupying Mosul. He even said, "It is my 
conviction that Turkey should leave its former passive and hesitant policies and 
engage in an active foreign policy" (Robins, 1992: 70). Following Ozal's death in 
1993, it can be said that Turkish foreign policy (on the basis of the issues studied 
here) 'quietened down.' Later, Foreign Minister Cem (14 July 1997 onwards) is in 
charge and in his 21. Yuzyzl, Turkiye ve Dunya, he clearly wants Turkish foreign 
policy to become more active (see also Kinzer, 1998a: 5). Thus, the findings indicate 
that certain individuals left their mark on Turkish foreign policy as well as backing 
up the assumption that individuals play a vital role in the foreign policy process. 
Morgan and Palmer's general theory of foreign policy is parsimonious as 
states are expected to pursue two goals (security and proaction) (1997: 225-244). 
Examining the four issues here on the basis of security seeking (maintaining the 
favorable aspects of status quo) or proaction seeking (changing the status quo in 
acceptable ways) helps in obtaining a picture of the positions of the actors. On the 
water issue, Turkey supports the maintenance of the status quo while the Syrians 
want to change the status quo as shown by their demand for more water. On the 
issue of security, Turkey showed in 1998 (and to a lesser degree in 1992) that it 
wanted changes. Turkey was successful but the fact that it had to be successful twice 
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indicates that its achievement was limited. Thus, Turkey was a proactive country in 
one case (i.e., security) and resisted change in the issue of water. 
The issues with the Greeks are less clear-cut. In the Aegean Sea, Turkey says 
that a change in the status quo of the territorial waters would constitute a casus belli. 
This would show the Turkish side as being the security seeking side but Veremis 
(1998) says that while Greece is for territorial status quo on the Aegean Sea, Turkey 
is challenging it. The Greek claim that Turks are challenging their territorial 
integrity and disrupting the status quo is contradictory with the fact that Turkish 
foreign policy avoids territorial aggrandizement at the expense of others (the only 
exception was Hatay). Rather, Turkey is saying that the status of some of the islands 
or islets is not clear. In the Cyprus issue, it is maintained by Veremis (1998) that the 
Turkish side is satisfied with the status quo on the island but that the Greeks are not. 
The high number of Turkish Cypriots leaving the island would dispute this claim. It 
seems outlandish to say that only Greeks want change. In the Aegean Sea, a case 
can be made that both countries believe themselves as to be seeking status quo. The 
fact that no progress has been made in Cyprus for decades seems to indicate that 
none of the sides are pushing hard enough for change. However, the Greek Cypriot 
attempt to install missiles so as to alter the balance of power on the island shows 
them as seeking change more than the rest. Yet, it should not be forgotten that the 
Greek Cypriots were hoping to use these missiles so as to obtain concessions from 
the Turkish side. In the issues between Turkey and Greece, it seems that each sees 
itself as being for the status quo and perceives the status quo differently. 
Turkish foreign policy, as has been mentioned above, is traditionally thought 
of as being one based on caution and support for international order and peace. The 
findings in this study show that on a number of key issues, Turkish foreign policy 
increasingly became more dynamic during the course of the 1990s. Thus, the 
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question that has to be posed is, "Do these findings show that a fundamental change 
has occurred in Turkish foreign policy?" Although the number of issues under study 
are too few and the time period rather limited to really answer this question with a 
great amount of certitude, a number of important factors lead one to answer the 
question in the negative. As the application of Morgan and Palmer's general theory 
of foreign policy (1997) above has shown, Turkey believes itself as being security 
seeking on three of the issues (security issue being the only one where it clearly 
wanted changes). Thus, Turkey's supposed new-found activism could be more an 
indication of Turkey continuing the traditional tenets of its foreign policy than a shift 
from the norm. Also, the dynamism and the assertive approaches to the issues were 
not dramatic enough. Other events such as Turkish restraint during crises such as 
Chechnya, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosova, its increasing participation in 
peacekeeping, and its role in the creation of organizations do not lead one to detect a 
change in its support of international order. The answer to this'question seems to be 
that Turkey has decided that its maintenance of its fundamental tenets of foreign 
policy required a greater amount of activity (and/or assertiveness) on its part. 
An examination of the findings in this study shows Fearon's stipulation of 
two types of costly signals that leaders use to show their foreign policy interests to 
other countries holds in the case of Turkey (1997: 68-90). The first type of signal, 
tying hands, involves the leader showing that if they do not follow through with their 
threats or commitments then the audience costs that had been created, i.e., tied 
hands, will take effect. The second type of signal, sunk costs, are fixed costs that the 
state suffers no matter what happens but have no effect on future actions, e.g., 
military expenditures. Turkish decision-makers use both signals. An example of 
sunk costs for Turkey would be Turkey's huge rate of military exercises which are 
used to send messages to Greece. Turkish decision-makers have many times made 
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statements in which they had effectively tied their hands, e.g., Tansu <;iller's 
statement, "We can't let a foreign flag fly on Turkish soil. The flag will come down" 
("Turkey: Turkey Tells Greece to Withdraw Forces," 1996). Turkish officials seem 
satisfied with the manner that crises conclude but should note that the tied hands 
strategy is the more successful, yet more risky, strategy (Fearon, 1997: 87). 
The lack of an external threat for much of the 1990s meant that Turkey and 
Greece were able to focus on issues dividing them and they were not constrained by 
external threats (e.g., the USSR during the Cold War). This would help to explain 
why the relations demonstrated more hostility than cooperation in the 1990s. Yet, 
despite the lack of an external threat which has been mentioned as a crucial factor in 
bringing Turkey and Greece together, it is noteworthy that the relations did not 
deteriorate greatly. The presence of reciprocity seems to have contributed favorably. 
Reciprocity has been shown in all of the issues to varying degrees. It seems 
correct to say that the actors committed similar behaviors at similar times. Russel J. 
Leng has shown on numerous occasions (1993; and 1998) that reciprocating strategy 
leads more to acceptable and peaceful solutions as well as cooperation than other 
strategies such as bullying and trail-and-error strategies. An inspection of the issues 
here shows that the countries tended to reciprocate to hostile or cooperative actions 
in kind as well as in the amount of actions. Bearing in mind that crises occurred in 
the nine year period without escalating to direct violence leads one to conclude that 
the reciprocity norm also had a soothing effect for Turkey as well as the other actors. 
The amount of reciprocity displayed by the various actors leads one to be 
hopeful that relations can improve. Osgood's original GRIT (Graduated 
Reciprocation in Tension-reduction) has been revamped by Goldstein and Freeman's 
'super-GRIT:' 'Super-GRIT' has been explained as a permanent extended-GRIT 
strategy which is made up of three rules that incorporate using sustainable 
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cooperative initiatives, strengthening reciprocity, and valuing long-term future and 
seeking to change psychological images and expectations (Goldstein and Freeman, 
1990: 14-22, 153).21 Although, there have unilateral initiatives by the various sides, 
(for example by Turkey in the Aegean Sea) it was not incorporated as a long-term 
strategy. Remembering that images do not change quickly, it is necessary that if a 
GRIT strategy is to be used then it has to be used for a long-time before any sizable 
gains in the relations can be witnessed. 
Greater cooperation might also be achieved through international 
organizations. Abbot and Snidal ( 1998) show that the key properties of 
organizations are centralization (providing a structure for collective activities) and 
independence (acting with a degree of autonomy in certain fields). This is not the 
place to suggest potential areas of cooperation made possible by organizations. 
Suffice it to say that there are various topics that the actors need to act upon (for 
example, in the sphere of environment) and since costs from unilateral actions are 
high, there is a huge need for collective action. Also, while countries might not be 
able to carry out certain issues face to face, international organizations provide a 
helpful arena. The limitations of such formations are clear. The fact that there is no 
real regional organization incorporating Syria and Turkey renders the possibilities 
for cooperation through such organizations difficult. Yet, remembering that despite 
the Turkish and Greek presence in numerous organizations, there is a lack of 
cooperation in the salient issues of Aegean Sea and Cyprus leads one to have doubts. 
Nonetheless, NATO's initiatives in the recent past are encouraging. Following a 
21 In the GRIT strategy. Charles Osgood called for unilateral de-escalation coupled with reciprocal 
behavior to the actions of the other. He was assuming that the traits of an arms race, e.g., 
reciprocity and unilateral behavior, could be used to defuse crises (Goldstein and Freeman, 1997: 
14-22). 
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non-aggression agreement signed in 1997 during the NA TO summit in Madrid 
between Turkey and Greece, Javier Solana, NA TO Secretary-General, reported in 
June 1998 that the two members had agreed upon a series of confidence-building 
measures in the Aegean Sea. This underlines the vital role that NA TO can play in 
de-escalation of tensions. 
Turkey's foreign policy is one based on negotiation and deterrence with the 
emphasis on the latter (Ayman, 1998). In recent history, e.g., the Cyprus 
intervention, Turkey has shown that it will not shy away from a confrontation. In 
fact, it can be said that Turkey is still using the credits from that crisis because the 
other sides remembering that Turkey will fight, back down first. However, it is 
unreasonable to assume that this situation will go on forever. If applied correctly, 
deterrence is an effective policy. Yet, an over-emphasis on a show of force can 
embroil Turkey in unwanted conditions. Also, there is no guarantee that the other 
side will continuously back down. Turkey demonstrated that it does not want war 
(and there were numerous occasions in the 1990s when it could have occurred as a 
result of domestic and international conditions). Assuming that Turkey will not want 
a war in the future, its continued reliance on demonstration of capabilities can result 
in an escalation into a situation in which Turkey might have to fight. 
What is being advocated here is not that Turkey should only follow a policy 
based on cooperation. It is obvious that such a policy could lead Turkey to being 
exploited. Rather, the correct policy should incorporate a sufficient dose of 
flexibility and firmness. It has been shown elsewhere that such a policy will lead to 
success (Patchen, 1988: 342). Turkey's general policy must be flexible and creative 
yet firm. Turkey must identify its core needs. On these matters, it must be firm. 
However, being firm does not mean that Turkey should automatically reject all 
opposing views or needs. It must actively listen and try to understand the other's 
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point of view. Misunderstanding can result in deadlocks. Listening to the other side 
does not mean that one accepts their view. Turkey should not be forthcoming with 
concessions on issues of vital importance. Making concessions hastily does not 
necessarily better relations but angers the constituencies, causes the other side to feel 
that they have to do nothing, draws charges of appeasement upon oneself, and 
hinders creation of a durable relationship. 
Turkey, as the party which has the greater resources, must be more flexible 
and creative. In issues of secondary importance, Turkey can afford to be flexible 
and must creatively use them to improve its external relations. Therefore, Turkey 
must identify what are issues of primary importance and issues of secondary 
if1!1Jortance. Decision-makers and opinion-makers have to reach some conclusions 
on these issues. They have to come to an agreement on what Turkey's needs and 
vital interests are. They must rank the different issues and be more flexible with 
issues of lesser importance. While it is true that these issues are generally 
interconnected and that they might be debated together, that does not mean that 
Turkey cannot be more forthcoming on certain issues of secondary importance, if it 
means that it will obtain a concession in an issue that is of primary importance. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
Applying content analysis to Turkey's relations with Greece and Syria 
revealed Turkey as being the more active and assertive country in the issues of 
Aegean Sea, Cyprus, security and water. The premise of increasing dynamism in 
Turkish foreign policy was supported. The findings in this study require further 
work in two different areas. Firstly, other issues occupying a central role in 
Turkey's foreign policy should be studied. Analyzing more issues will result in a 
more thorough understanding of Turkish foreign policy. Issues requiring further 
study emerge out of Turkey's relations with Russia, Iran, Central Asia and EU. 
These issues of importance to Turkey can be better studied if the method used was 
further enhanced. Thus, proposals to increase reliability and validity will be 
subsequently offered. 
Turkey's interactions with Russia and Iran deserve further study. Although 
these countries do not conjure up the same feelings and thoughts as Greece and Syria 
do, they are still considered as 'rivals' (Miiftti, 1998). Russia and Iran have seen that 
it is in their geopolitical interests to curb Turkish aggrandizement (backed by the 
United States) in areas of importance to them, e.g., Central Asia. 
Studying the interactions between the Central Asian republics and Turkey 
would be high revealing for a number of reasons. An examination of the relations 
between the Central Asian countries and Turkey through events data can show the 
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true degree and quality of relations. This is an especially important issue that 
deserves further attention due to the contradicting opinions on the nature of relations 
as well as the general lack of systematic studies on this field. It would also indicate 
whether the independence of these countries has meant a change in Turkish foreign 
policy's western orientation. 
As a major part of Turkish foreign policy is assumed to be conducted with 
the EU over the issue of European integration, the importance of studying the 
interactions between Turkey and the EU are clear. Besides the obvious relevance for 
Turkey, examining this relationship will also have policy implications for other 
countries aiming to join international organizations. 
However, the findings from the issues mentioned above would be approached 
with more confidence if the reliability and validity of the method were higher. An 
improvement can be achieved in validity by comparing the information provided in 
one news source with another. Therefore, news from Reuters could be compared 
with news provided by Agence France-Presse, United Press International, or 
Associated Press. A high degree of similarity in the type and amount of reporting 
will lead to higher degrees of confidence in validity. 
The qualified activism that was witnessed for Turkish foreign policy in this 
study needs to further undergo more studies. It is possible that the activism in the 
data in the post-1995 period was not due to greater amount of activity on the part of 
Turkey but rather to Reuters itself. Although this is quite unlikely, a study that 
controls for the Reuters factor could solve this problem. However, the fact that this 
question has to be asked leads one to conclude that ensuing studies using events data 
should utilize more than one news source. This would increase both the reliability 
and validity. 
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Reliability would be improved through more refined measures. Better 
constructed measures will result in more specific information being captured 
(Neuman, 1997: 140). What is called for is not solely a quantitative increase in the 
number of categories but rather better defined categories. No matter what the 
number of categories is, imprecise categories will be detrimental to the reliability. 
All of the above recommendations can be conducted easier if a SAFED-type 
set for Turkey existed. A 'Turkish Foreign Events Data' set can start by focusing on 
Turkey's immediate neighborhood and later include interactions with actors of 
importance to Turkey. Although the creation of such a set is not easy, it is certainly 
not impossible and it will facilitate the systematic study of Turkey's external 
interactions. 
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